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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The events of September 11th 2001 clearly indicate that the United States of 
America is entering a 21st Century that is fraught with peril,  uncertainty and chaos unlike 
that experienced in previous centuries.  This environment presents a unique challenge to 
the American military forces tasked with ensuring the safety of American interests abroad 
and those of the homeland.  Continuing reductio ns in personnel strength, combined with 
increasing demand, has resulted in a military force that is asked to do more with less.  
Thinly spread around the globe and tasked with increasing commitments military 
personnel must become more efficient, more intelligent, and more resourceful than ever 
before.   
A method of achieving these results that the military is becoming more and more 
dependent upon is contingency contracting.  With fewer ships and aircraft to ferry 
supplies from the continental United States to an area of operations the military is 
increasingly reliant upon local sources for much of its support.  This is true for military 
training exercises with foreign nations as well.  In order to obtain this local support, 
contingency contracting personnel authorized to enter into contractual agreements on 
behalf of the United States Government, must be capable of deploying to the area of 
operations in order to draft and authorize the purchase of foreign supplies.  
These contingency contracting personnel ser ving within the United States Marine 
Corps are especially important to the success of deployed Marine Forces.  These Marines 
are normally deployed alone or in pairs for large operations and must carry a huge burden 
of responsibility for providing support t hat can mean life or death to Marines half a world 
from home while safeguarding the public funds they are entrusted with and ensuring they 
are utilized in a legal, ethical and efficient manner.  How well these contracting Marines 
shoulder this burden depends upon many factors ranging from the training and education 
they receive to the support they are given while deployed.    
This study will evaluate how well contingency contracting Marines are prepared 
to accomplish their mission given the environment they  are faced with and the challenges 
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that confront them.  The goal is to investigate possible ways to improve the personnel 
career development of these contingency contracting Marines, thereby improving their 
ability to provided support to deployed Marines.  The ability to obtain desperately needed 
supplies that are reliable and economical is an invaluable asset to the commander of 
deployed Marines.      
B. OBJECTIVES  
The primary purpose of this study is to review the current policies and 
organizational structure of the United States Marine Corps military contracting force and 
how they impact the career development of those Marines assigned to the force.  Then an 
analysis will be made of the approach other Department of Defense organizations use to 
develop their contingency contracting force to determine the best practices currently 
being employed.  Combined with data collected from literature reviews, personal 
interviews and survey questions, this study will attempt to analyze the strengths and 
weaknesses associated with the current Marine Corps approach to career development 
and assess its overall effectiveness.  The data will then be analyzed to determine 
alternative means of improving career development within the contingency contracting 
force.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research question will be used to direct and guide the 
objectives of this study: 
What effect has the changing contingency contracting environment had on 
personnel career development within the United States Marine Corps contingency 
contracting force and how might career development policies and processes be 
improved? 
In order to fully answer this primary research question, additional areas must be 
examined and fully understood.  To do so, the following secondary questions will be 
explored in this study: 
· How is career development currently being addressed within the United 
States Marine Corps contingency contracting community?  
· What can be learned from effective career development practices within 
other military organizations and or Department of Defense activities? 
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· What training and education issues are affecting contingency contracting 
personnel and their career opportunities? 
· Should the personnel structure of Marine Corps contracting offices be 
changed to accommodate improved career development opportunities? 
· What changes are necessary to improve personnel career development 
within the contingency contracting force? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this thesis will include a thorough review of the policies th at guide 
the training, education and command structure of the enlisted Marines assigned to 
contingency contracting billets within the Marine Corps.  The research will then turn to 
an in-depth analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the enlisted Marin e contracting 
specialist.  This will include a comparison of contracting duties expected of enlisted 
Marines while assigned to garrison contracting billets and those while assigned to the 
contingency contracting billets and how they interrelate to provide the contracting 
specialist the experience needed to perform his job.   
Although the overall Marine Corps Contracting Force consists of officer, enlisted, 
and civilian Marines, this study will be limited to the enlisted community.  Civilian 
Marines do currently deploy in support of contingency operations – only the officers and 
enlisted deploy to support training or contingency exercises.  The population of officers 
serving in contingency contracting billets is too restricted to be the basis of this study.  
The larger population of enlisted contingency contracting personnel is adequate to draw 
conclusions about the how well Marine Corps personnel conduct contingency 
contracting.  The study will, however, be further restricted to the three Force Service 
Support Groups (FSSGs) within the Marine Corps.  With the exception of a few enlisted 
Marines serving in joint command billets, the majority of contingency contracting 
Marines that are available to deploy in support of contingencies or exercises are located 
within one of these three FSSGs.  There have been situations where Marines assigned to 
garrison billets have been deployed to support operations, however, this is rare and 
heavily dependent upon the qualifications of the individual Marine and the ability of th e 
garrison commander to cover that Marine’s responsibilities while he is gone.     
This study is based upon several assumptions that are required to support the 
validity of this study’s purpose of improving career development within the Marine 
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Corps contingency contracting force.  First, it is assumed that the operational tempo 
experienced by the Marine Corps will continue into the indefinite future.  Further it is 
assumed that this operational tempo will continue to demand the participation of Marine 
Corps contingency contracting personnel in support of deployed forces that is comparable 
to current requirements.   
A subsequent assumption is that the Marine Corps will be able and willing to 
implement any changes to current policy proposed by this thesis.  Changes to current 
force structure, implementations of innovative solutions and proponents within leadership 
willing to try innovative solutions make this a window of opportunity ripe for improved 
practices to bear fruit.   
E.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research began with a thorough literature review of 
books, magazine articles, studies, journals, policies, Marine Corps Orders and Directives, 
Marine Corps Doctrine and other resources that deal with the subject of Marine Co rps 
contracting in general.  From there, the research narrowed and focused on the specific 
literature that deals with the enlisted contingency contracting personnel and how they are 
trained, educated and assigned.  Once a thorough understanding of the environment 
within which enlisted contingency contracting Marines serve was obtained, the researcher 
then turned to a literature review of contingency contracting guidance used by other U.S. 
Military Services.   
Interviews were conducted with current and former Marine Corps contracting 
personnel and representatives from the customers they serve to ferret out problems, issues 
and challenges faced by the Marine Corps enlisted contingency contracting force.  
Interviews were also conducted as needed to clarify the approach to contingency 
contracting used by the other Military Services.  The interview questions were tailored to 
the situation in order to clarify the understanding of how the guidelines established in the 
documents examined are actually implemented.    
Concurrent with the interviews, a survey was conducted to determine how the 
attitudes of the contingency contracting Marines currently serving in those billets are 
being affected by the implementation of current policies, and their reactions to proposed 
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changes to them.  Survey questions were designed to elicit perceived problems and 
recommendations for improvement from those closest to the issues.  The web -based 
survey attempted to capture responses from as many individuals as possible that are 
currently in the 3044 MOS.   
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1. Contingency 
A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces 
in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse 
of law and order, political instability, or military operations.  
Contingencies require plans for rapid response and special procedures to 
ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment.  
For contracting purposes, contingencies result from the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) declaring a particular mission or crisis a contingency, 
or when the President initiates select Reserve personnel call -ups specified 
in Public Law. 
2. Contingency Contracting 
Contingency contracting is the process by which essential supplies and 
services needed to sustain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the 
US Government.  It includes emergency contracting in the continental 
United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States 
(OCONUS) for those actions necessary to support mobilizing and 
deploying units.  
3. Contracting 
Contracting is purchasing, renting, leasing or otherwise obtaining required 
goods and services from commercial sources.  Contracting functions 
include preparing descriptions of required supplies and services, selec tion 
and soliciting sources, preparing and awarding contracts, and all aspects of 
contract administration.  It does not include making grants or cooperative 
agreements. [Ref 1]  
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This research is comprised of six chapters covering th e following subject areas:   
Chapter I established the rationale, limitations, and objectives behind why this 
study was undertaken and the goals it aims to achieve.  
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Chapter II contains background information on the policies and processes that 
guide the contingency contracting force within the Marine Corps.  It is composed of three 
sections that explored the history of contingency contracting, the reasons driving our 
reliance on deployed contracting support, and concludes with an examination of the 
evolution of the rules and regulations that govern contingency contracting.  The historical 
perspective in this chapter includes items like overseas depot facilities that would not 
normally involve enlisted contingency contracting personnel because of their scope and 
complexity.  They are included here to give the reader an appreciation of how diverse the 
items are that fall within the realm of providing goods and services to deployed forces 
during a contingency operation.   
Chapter III presents the data collected by the researcher through literature reviews 
and personal interviews that describes how each of the Military Services (Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marines) approach the issue of enlisted contingency contracting 
personnel.  The data contained in this chapter is primarily focused on how each Service 
selects, educates, trains, structures and employs its enlisted personnel.   
Chapter IV contains the results of a survey conducted by the researcher that was 
administered to Marines currently serving in the contracting forces of the United States 
Marine Corps.  This survey asked respondents questions regarding training, education, 
structure, and employment from their perspective.    
Chapter IV contains an analysis of the data collected in Chapters II, III, and IV.  
This chapter identifies strengths and weaknesses within the approach each of the Military 
Services has taken toward contingency contracting.   





Entering into contractual arrangements with civilian organizations to support 
military operations, either in a garrison setting or in a deployed environment, is not a new 
concept for the American Military Forces.  The subject of this study is contin gency 
contracting.  This universally accepted term describes the actions required to purchase 
support for military units engaged in operations that are deemed a contingency.  The 
terms contingency and contracting have been defined in the definitions sectio n of Chapter 
I.  The roots of contingency contracting can be traced at least as far back as the 
campaigns of Alexander the Great who acquired supplies for his Army through purchases 
made in local markets in addition to those he acquired through force.  [Ref 2]  The 
genesis of American contingency contracting, however, can be found in this country’s 
fight for independence.  Since that time, contingency contracting has been a vital part of 
every major military operation embarked upon by United States Military  Forces.   
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical perspective on the evolution 
of contingency contracting within the Department of Defense.  Examples from selected 
periods throughout American military history will be used to develop an unde rstanding of 
the military’s continuing reliance upon contingency contracting and how it has changed 
over time.  The chapter will then look at the forces that are driving this changing reliance.  
Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the Government-wide laws and 
regulations that govern the military personnel charged with conducting contingency 
contracting.  This perspective will provide a backdrop to aid the reader’s understanding 
of the current approach to contingency contracting developed in later chapters of this 
work.  
B. EARLY CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN AMERICA 
1. Revolutionary War 
The early development of contingency contracting to support American military 
operations can be traced all the way back to the founding of the United States an d the 
Military Services created for its protection.  To support General George Washington’s 
Army during the American Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress levied upon 
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each colonial state a requirement to contribute subsistence items to support the Ar my’s 
needs.  The major problem that soon arose was a logistical one.  The limited assets at the 
Army’s disposal: wagons, horses, drivers, etc., were inadequate to transport these 
contributions of food and supplies from distant states to the men fighting on  the front 
lines.  It was Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, who solved this dilemma.  He 
developed a plan to sell food and supplies received from these distant states and use the 
proceeds to employ civilian contractors near the front to supply the Army with food and 
supplies purchased locally.  Robert Morris can, therefore, be considered the father of 
American contingency contracting and his solution the initiation of the contingency 
contracting process that continues to this day.  [Ref 3]  
2. Civil War 
The use of contingency contracting during the American Civil War provided 
critical support ranging from civilian surgeons and nurses to telegraph operators.  For 
example, a small military staff under the command of Brigadier General Daniel 
McCallum and a cadre of about 25,000 civilians was responsible for operating 2,100 
miles of captured or constructed rail lines in direct support of Union field armies.  [Ref 4]  
In fact, the only female Medal of Honor recipient was a civilian working under contrac t 
for the Union.  Dr. Mary Edwards Walker served with the title “Contract Assistant 
Surgeon” for the Union Army during the Civil War.  President Andrew Johnson awarded 
her the medal on 11 November 1865.  Although the medal was rescinded by the War 
Department in 1917, President Jimmy Carter restored it posthumously in 1977.  [Ref 5]  
In addition, the Army Quartermasters became very successful at supplying rations 
to the Union Army.  Their approach was to contract with businessmen known as Sutlers.  
These individuals would follow the Union forces and procure rations from local 
merchants or producers and then sell them to the Army.  Although some of these Sutlers 
were less than scrupulous and took advantage of their Army patrons, they were very 
instrumental in supplying rations to the Army and reduced the ancient practice of field 





C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OVERSEAS 
1. World War I 
During World War I, the American military found itself using large quantities of 
contracted support outside the geographical boundaries of the continental United States.  
The stagnate trench-warfare being waged in Europe consumed vast quantities of food, 
ammunition, clothing, and all other manner of supplies and services.  To keep up  with 
this demand, the military turned again to contracting with civilians to support its needs.  
The following diverse examples indicate how widespread the use of contracting was 
during this war.  The Army Transport Service managed 1,000 miles of French railroads 
and employed 2,200 French civilian crewmen as well as U.S. railroad troops.  Engineers 
employed in France peaked at 34,000 civilians working on base construction, depots, 
ports, and roads.  Throughout the war, members of the Army’s Service of Supp ly (SOS) 
branch administered contracts with local civilians to provide this desperately needed 
support.  [Ref 4] 
2. World War II 
American participation in World War II utilized contingency contracting as well.  
to provide goods and services.  Military forc es from the United States were again fighting 
in Europe.  In addition, the military found itself fighting on a second front in the Pacific 
Ocean, half a world away from the battles being waged in Europe.  To compound the 
problems associated with this “two-front” war the rapid technological changes that were 
beginning to affect the battlefield in the First World War escalated sharply as the use of 
aviation and mechanized forces greatly increased the amount of material support required 
for the military forces .  This increased reliance on technology demanded a 
correspondingly higher level of contract actions.  For example, a large proportion of this 
increase in contacting resulted from employing 1,706 ocean going ships and 33, 846 
civilian seaman.  In addition, the increased complexity of Army equipment caused the 
Army to contract for things such as maintenance and land based transportation.  As for 
maintenance, when the Army ran short of critical tank engines in 1944 a contract was 
negotiated with the French firm Gnome-Rhone to rebuild 252 Sherman tank engines and 
contracted repair of combat vehicles peaked at 800 per month in 1945.  [Ref 4]  
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D. COLD WAR ERA 
1. Korea and Vietnam 
The use of contingency contracting continued during the Korean War with the 
first use of commercial aircraft to transport military personnel to the war -torn country.  
Additionally, the U.S. Military employed over 10,000 Korean and Japanese civilians to 
work port operations at Pusan.  The long distance from America to Korea presented a 
problem for military equipment need major maintenance work.  To solve this dilemma 
the U.S. Military employed over 42,000 Japanese and 300 American civilians to perform 
maintenance in depots located in Japan.  The U.S. Government estimates that it saved 
$9.5 billion by not returning equipment to the U.S.  Records show that by 1952, 60 
percent of the artillery, 71 percent of the infantry weapons, and 41 percent of the tanks 
used in Korea were cycled through depot centers in Japan.  The U.S. Military even used 
50,000 civilian porters from the native population of Korea to carry supplies for the 
Army [Ref 4] 
The trend to use civilian aircraft to transport military personnel continued during 
the Viet Nam War as 90 percent of the troops and 28 percent of the suppli es used in the 
war utilized commercially contracted air services.  Since the concept of operations used 
by the U.S. Forces relied upon patrols sent out from base camps, base construction and 
facilities support was heavily reliant on civilian contractors.  During the buildup phase of 
1966 about 51,000 civilians were used on all the engineering projects completed.  The 
use of overseas depots continued during Viet Nam as over 50 percent of the direct 
support for helicopter maintenance came from civilian contractors, and civilian-operated 
depots rebuilt combat and other vehicles in Japan and Okinawa.  [Ref 4]  
2. Persian Gulf War 
During the Persian Gulf War, the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates 
that, in addition to the 5,000 U.S. Government civilians, there were 9,200 contracted 
employees deployed in support of U.S. Forces providing maintenance for high -tech 
equipment in addition to water, food, construction, and other services.  [Ref 7]  Of this 
number, 969 were representing 76 different U.S. Contractors.  These civilian contractors 
deployed at about the same time as the military forces and a few of them even went into 
Iraq and Kuwait with the combat elements.  [Ref 8]   
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E.  POST COLD WAR  
1. Somalia 
To support Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope in the country of 
Somalia the U.S. Army used its new Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
to award a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract to Brown and Root Services 
Corporation.  This program was developed to meet the challenges of “downsized” 
military.  The contract was initially for one year with four one-year renewal options.  The 
following benefits are touted as the results of using the program:  
· Expanded Lift Capability.  Civilian transportation assets can be used to the 
fullest extent allowing more efficient use of military transportation 
· Flexibility.  Logistics assets can be added or subtracted as needed  
· Cost effectiveness.  The price paid the contractor is less than similar 
services would cost for the military to provide 
· Economy of Force.  Military manpower can be better used for combat and 
other critical tasks  [Ref 9]  
Under this contract arrangement, Brown and Root Services earned $62 million for 
building and maintaining Army base camps.  This support was provided to all the 
military units operating in the country.  [Ref 10] 
2. Haiti 
In September 1994, U.S. troops were deployed to Haiti for Operation Uphold 
Democracy.  The Army’s LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root Services was again 
put into action.  Initially these contractors were used to supplement military supply 
sources and then assumed the majority of the logistics operations for military units in 
Haiti.  This peacekeeping operation marked the first time the Defense Logistics Agency 
employed a Contingency Support Team (CST) to support a contingency.  Within 60 days, 
500 Brown and Root personnel were supporting 15,000 soldiers by supplying more than 
150,000 gallons of potable water, 40,000 gallons of fuel, 8,000 bundles of laundry, built 
29 shower units and 29 dinning facilities, and filled over 200 supply requests for items 
ranging from paper plates to plywood.  [Ref 11]  Just two years after Somalia, Brown and 
Root Services was able to double its Somalia earnings, making $133 million for building 




The Pentagon estimated that about 600 civilians and 1,400 contractors were 
initially deployed to Bosnia to support 22,000 troops conducting peacekeeping missions 
in that area.  [Ref 12]  Here in the Balkans the military’s increasing relian ce on 
contingency contracting for logistical support can be seen in the rising expenditures on 
contract support during the military operations in Bosnia.  From December 1995, through 
May 1997, the Army expended $546.6 million for contracted services.  Due to the 
extended time troops were in the region, an additional contract with a value of $413.5 
million was issued to Brown and Root to cover the period from May 1997 to May of 
1999.  The expenditures then rose quickly to $625 million for the one -year period from 
May 1999 to April 2000.  [Ref 13] 
F. RATIO OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS TO MILITARY PERSONNEL 
An alternative method of determining how reliant the military forces are on 
contingency contracting to support military operations is to look at the ratio of con tracted 
civilians to military personnel deployed to the conflict area.  This ratio was 
approximately 1:6 civilians to combatants during the Revolutionary War.  Except for 
World War I when the ratio reached 1:20 and the Korean War when it fell to 1:2.5, the 
ratio remained approximately 1:6.  [Ref 4]   
During the Persian Gulf War the ratio increased sharply to 1:50.  [Ref 14]  
Following the Persian Gulf War the ratio has been steadily declining.  It reached 1:30 
during operations in Haiti where 500 Civilians working for Brown and Root Services 
were supporting 15,000 military personnel.  [Ref 11]  The ratio fell to 1:10 during the 
initial operations in Bosnia.  [Ref 14]  Recent articles indicate that the ratio of civilians to 
military personnel may currently be close to 2.5:1 in the Balkans.  [Ref 10]  
These changing ratios are summarized in Table 1.  This table does not include 
information pertaining to current operations being conducted in support of the War on 
Terrorism, but indications from personnel returnin g from there indicate that civilian 
contractors continue to be employed by the military forces operating in areas near 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  [Ref 15]  Table 1 was initially developed by Major William 
Epley, but has been modified to reflect recent information from conflicts that occurred 
after Major Epley developed it.  [Ref 4] 
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CONFLICT RATIO OF CIVILIANS TO SOLDIERS 
Revolutionary War 1:6 
Civil War 1:5 
World War I 1:20 
World War II 1:6 
Korean Conflict 1:2.5 
Vietnam Conflict 1:6 




Table 1.   Civilian to Combatant Ratio After: [Ref 4] 
 
G. TRENDS DRIVING THE INCREASED RELIANCE ON CONTRACTING 
With an historical perspective on the time honored tradition of contingency 
contracting in support of deployed military personnel, this chapter turns to an 
examination of the trends that are driving the military’s escalating reliance on 
contingency contracting.  Although the following trends are not all inclusive, they 
indicate that multiple forces are at work making the use of  civilian contractors more 
attractive to the military.   
1. Reduction in Military Personnel Structure  
The most obvious reason for the military embracing contingency contracting is 
the military “downsizing” of the 1990’s.  Since the end of the Cold War, act ive duty 
military forces have been reduced by 700,000 positions.  In addition, more than 300,000 
Department of Defense civilian positions have been eliminated.  [Ref 14]  This equates to 
a 30 percent loss in manpower across the spectrum of Military Services over the last 15 
years.  All branches of the Service have reduced the size of their forces from their 
strength at the height of the Persian Gulf War.  [Ref 16]  
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These reductions have created an imbalance between the number of actual 
combatants that can be fielded and the number of non-combatant personnel required to 
support these war fighters.  The term that has been commonly used to refer to this 
imbalance is the “tooth-to-tail” ratio.  The “tooth” refers to the combat power of the 
American military and the “tail” is a reference to the support forces that ensure combat 
power can be applied and sustained as needed.  This was such a concern to Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen that he instituted the Tooth-to-Tail Commission to find ways to 
reduce the tail portion of the defense budget.  The Commission found that this ratio was 
close to 50:50 trigger pullers to support personnel, but had grown to nearly 70% tail 
currently.  In fact, some DoD statistics indicate that only 14 percent of the 2.5 million 
members of the Armed Services are officially listed in combat positions.  [Ref 17]  
The mandated ceilings on personnel end strength and the increased number of 
support personnel has created a situation where Army commanders, for instance, rob 
deploying units of their personnel and equipment to support units deployed to operations 
in Bosnia, Haiti, and other regions.  [Ref 18]  This author likewise experienced similar 
personnel juggling to support deployments while serving as the S-4 Officer for 3rd 
Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division from 1993 until 1996.  
2. Reductions in Fiscal Structure  
Closely correlated to and partially driving the reduced manpower levels indicated 
above is the reduced level of the Defense Budget, which has been reduced by 40 per cent 
in real terms.  The DoD portion of the budget has shifted significantly over the past 30 
years.  In 1962, the defense portion of the budget was 9.3 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  Except for a spike to 9.4 percent during the Vietnam War,  it continues to 
decline.  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) records indicate that the current 
defense budget is 3.3 percent of GDP.  [Ref 17] 
Reduced funding has prompted a number of initiatives within DoD to limit 
expenses and free up support funds that can be used to maximize the use of scarce 
resources. As a result, the military has begun evaluating what its “core competencies” are 
and doing cost benefit analysis and best value comparisons to determine which functions 
it should continue to be organic capabilities and which functions can be outsourced.  Part 
of this analysis requires an evaluation of the cost of contractor support compared to the 
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cost required to train and retain military personnel capable of performing a given 
function.   
3. Cost of Contractor Support Compared to Military Personnel Costs  
The efforts to determine if the cost of using contracted labor versus military 
personnel is getting a lot of attention due to the large amounts of some of the contracts 
being issued.  The Navy and the Marine Corps are in the process of converting their 
computer support needs to a completely contracted venture.  The Navy and Marine Corps 
Intranet, or NMCI, program works under what is called a “seat management” concept.  
This concept requires the civilian organization to provide a certain number of computer 
seats that are maintained and updated completely by contracted civilians.  This service 
contract will allow the Navy and the Marine Corps to reduce significantly the number of 
personnel they have devoted to Information Technology.  This program has just been 
increase by $1.96 billion to a total cost of $8.8 billion for seven years with 3 option years.  
[Ref 19] 
In spite of enormous price tags such as the one for NMCI, the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization estimated savings of up to $7 billion 
to $12 billion annually by the end of FY 2002.  [Ref 20]  In addition to reducing 
expenditures, outsourcing can present savings in personnel numbers as well.  The high 
price tags for support prompted the Logistics Management Institute to conduct an 
examination of the contracted logistics support in Bosnia.  The Institute estimated that it 
would have taken 8,900 support troops to provide the same service that Brown and Root 
Services provided with 6,700 employees.  Part of these savings came as a result of using 
local nationals to perform many of the labor-intensive support items.  These local 
nationals are less expensive than the cost of a military member.  [Ref 13]]  
4. Increased Operational Tempo 
Since 1990, the pace of military operations has grown tremendously, making it 
difficult to maintain combat training schedules for units at the company level and above.  
An alarming turnover ratio has also compounded the problem.  In the Air Forc e, for 
instance, on any given day 12,000 airmen are deployed, compared with only about 2,000 
before the Persian Gulf War.  In the years between 1982 and 1989, the Marines were 
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involved in 15 contingency operations; since 1989, they have participated in 62 such 
operations.  [Ref 18]  
The Army, likewise, has experienced a 300 percent increase in mission 
commitments during the past several years, and they do not appear to be tapering off.  
[Ref 21]  In fact, the U.S. Army has deployed troops on 36 occasions com pared to 10 
deployments during the 40-year Cold War.  The National Guard and the Armed Forces 
Reserves are performing 13 times the man-days of service per year than they contributed 
prior to the fall of the Soviet Union.  [Ref 7]  
5. Limited Military Presence 
The increased operational tempo discussed above has been driven by U.S. 
involvement in multinational peacekeeping operations throughout the world.  Political 
constraints in these areas limit the number of troops that can be deployed to support the 
mission.  As a result, the Army has relied heavily on the use of contractors to provide 
support operations, normally done by soldiers.  The use of non -combatants that do not 
count against the force totals permit the Army to maximize their combat troops in the 
area of operations while still remaining within the constraints mandated by the authority 
over the military.  Former President Bill Clinton was keenly aware of this when he 
promised to limit to 20,000 the number of troops deployed to Bosnia.  [Ref 12]  
6. Additional Political Benefits  
In addition to maximizing combat troops added benefits can be found in the use of 
local nationals to fill in for the shortage of support troops.  During Operation Joint 
Endeavor, the government of Hungary would not allow the civ ilian contractor, providing 
support to the military operations there, to bring employees into their country since it was 
not part of the omnibus agreement.  The Hungarian government was eventually 
persuaded to allow these employees access after it received assurances that a large 
portion of Brown and Root Services’ work force would include Hungarians.  [Ref 22]  
When local civilians are hired, contractor support becomes a vehicle for putting 
hard-pressed local nationals back to work in a depressed economy.  Vital skills that may 
have been lost for a generation can be taught to young people and thus infused into a 
suffering society.  The use of contracted goods and services can rejuvenate the local 
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economy as in Bosnia where it became a pillar in the commandin g general’s strategic 
campaign.  [Ref 23] 
Government initiatives of this nature, infusing American funds into a depressed 
local economy, foster a favorable impression of the U.S. military’s presence in a foreign 
country.  In addition, the reduced number of  military troops deployed to a ravaged 
country reduced the perception that the country is being occupied.  [Ref 13]  
7. High-Technology Weapon Systems 
The environment has changed considerably since DoD Directive 1130.2, 
Management and Control for Engineerin g and Technical Services, was published.  That 
document required the military to maintain technicians capable of supporting vital 
military systems.  Today, that document is gone and the philosophy that generated it has 
been revised.  Continual and rapid technological change has made it uneconomical to 
keep military personnel capable of maintaining and troubleshooting sophisticated 
weapons.  [Ref 14]   
As an example, General Dynamics Services Company had more than 100 
employees in Saudi Arabia prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm, the majority of 
them supporting the maintenance contract the Army had for its family of wheeled and 
tracked vehicles. [Ref 24]  
The Office of the Inspector General also indicated that reliance on contractor 
support is primarily attributable to the increased technical complexity of weapons and 
other defense systems resulting from the Military Departments’ force modernization 
efforts.  In addition, the perceived need to put into operation new systems before 
adequately trained military technicians are available is increasing the need to have 
contractors near the front.  [Ref 25] 
8. Reduced Infrastructure Overseas  
The continued reduction in U.S. force structure has resulted in a number of base 
closures overseas and diminished troop  strength in forward deployed locations.  With the 
loss of this infrastructure overseas, organic support would have to be deployed from the 
continental United States to the area of operations.  Theater support contractors provide 
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an in-place capability that does not have to be deployed.  This saves time and effort 
during deployment operations.  [Ref 5]  
An example of how much of the overseas infrastructure that has been reduced can 
be found in the Army’s reduction in deployed personnel in Europe.  Before th e collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1989, there were more than 200,000 soldiers based in Europe.  
Today, there are fewer than 60,000 U.S. troops in Europe.  [Ref 18]  
H. EVOLVING CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING REGULATIONS  
The reader should now have a mental framework of how the use of contingency 
contracting has evolved throughout the history of the United States, as well as an 
understanding of some of the multitude of forces that are propelling a continued reliance 
upon contingency contracting.  This chapter conclu des with an examination of the rules 
and regulations that have been established in an effort to standardize contingency 
contracting procedures and the concerns that prompted them.  
1. The Call for Reform 
Although Government regulations pertaining to contracting have been around 
since the Revolutionary War, the roots of contemporary contracting within the 
Department of Defense effectively began with the end of the Second World War.  During 
that war the nation’s economy was completely immersed in the production of war 
materials.  When it ended however, the reduction in military forces called into question 
many of the contracts the Government had needed to support the war.  Under the scrutiny 
of DoD contracts the contracting process itself began to be questioned.  Concerns began 
to arise not just over what the Government was contracting for, but how it was 
conducting the contracting process.  These concerns initiated a series of commissions that 
were established during the 50-year Cold War era to study the contracting process with 
DoD.  Many of these commissions identified weaknesses within the Executive Branch’s 
Department of Defense and called for changes or “reform” in the Department of Defense 
acquisition community.  [Ref 27] 
Some of the comments generated by these commissions regarding the 
professionalism of the Government acquisition process are listed below: 
This failure is reflected further in the personnel system, which does not 
provide competent staff to fill supply positions.  Although purchasing is a 
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highly skilled profession that requires intimate knowledge of trade 
conditions and markets, Government agencies are inadequate to recruit 
and keep persons with the required professional competence, personnel 
processes fail to make proper acknowledgement of the  skills required.  
[Ref 28]  
The Secretary of Defense should establish a policy requiring each military 
department to develop and assign career -trained personnel to technical and 
executive posts throughout the field of procurement management. [Ref 29]  
The promotion and rotation system of the Military Services do not 
facilitate career development in the technical and professional activities 
such as research and development, procurement, intelligence, 
communications and automatic data processing. [Ref 30]  
The commission recognized that although procurement was not yet a 
profession, the increasing complexity and importance of the procurement 
process demand a more competent and professional workforce. [Ref 31]  
Chances for meaningful improvement will come not f rom mere regulation 
but only with major institutional change.  Common sense must be made to 
prevail alike in the enactments of Congress and the operations of the 
Department.  We must give acquisition personnel more authority to do 
their jobs. [Ref 32] 
It is clear that there is no lack of statutory, Executive Order and outside 
expert identification of problems and recommended changes that should 
be pursued to improve the quality and professionalism of the acquisition 
workforce.  Yet despite the obvious chang es made in the recent past, few 
are convinced that enough has been done.  New and varied proposals to 
change the organization or character of the acquisition workforce have 
been espoused with increasing efficiency.  [Ref 33] 
The chart in Table 2 was created by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Reeves for his 
Executive Research Project, “The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present and 
Future.”  In his study he clearly identifies a recurring finding of these commissions that 
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2. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
Attempts were made throughout this 50 -year period to improve the acquisition 
process, yet substantial changes were not aimed at the Acquisition Workforce until the 
implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 
1990.  This Act became Section 1202, “Defense Acquisition Workforce”, of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.  Congressional passage of this 
authorization act added DAWIA to Public Law 101-510 of 1990, which amended Title 10 
United States Code by incorporating its provisions as chapter 87 of Subtitle A “Armed 
Forces”.  This first draft of Chapter 87 levied requirements upon the Defense Department 
in five broad categories or subchapters: General Authorities and Responsibilities, 
Defense Acquisition Positions, Acquisition Corps, Education and Training,  and General 
Management Provisions.  The subchapter of particular note to this study is Subchapter II 
Defense Acquisition Positions.  This subchapter established the following qualification 
requirements, under Section 1724, for contracting officers within the military: 
`(a) CONTRACTING OFFICERS- The Secretary of Defense shall require 
that, beginning on October 1, 1993, in order to qualify to serve in an 
acquisition position as a contracting officer with authority to award or 
administer contracts for amounts above the small purchase threshold 
referred to in section 2304(g) of this title, a person must (except as 
provided in subsections (c) and (d))-- 
`(1) have completed all mandatory contracting courses required for a 
contracting officer at the grade level, or in the position within the grade of 
the General Schedule (in the case of an employee), that the person is 
serving in; 
`(2) have at least two years of experience in a contracting position;  
`(3)(A) have received a baccalaureate degree from an accredited 
educational institution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees, (B) have 
completed at least 24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study 
from an accredited institution of higher education in any of the following 
disciplines: accounting, business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, and 
organization and management, or (C) have passed an examination 
considered by the Secretary of Defense to demonstrate skills, knowledge, 
or abilities comparable to that of an individual who has completed at least 
24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study from an accredited 
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institution of higher education in any of the disciplines listed in 
subparagraph (B); and 
`(4) meet such additional requirements, based on the dollar value and 
complexity of the contracts awarded or administered in the position, as 
may be established by the Secretary of Defense for the position.  [Ref 35]  
In addition, Section 1724 of Chapter 87 went on to establish the following 
qualification requirements for the civilian contracting personnel within the military 
community: 
`(b) GS-1102 SERIES- The Secretary of Defense shall require that, 
beginning on October 1, 1993, a person may not be employed by the 
Department of Defens e in the GS-1102 occupational series unless the 
person (except as provided in subsections (c) and (d)) meets the 
requirements set forth in subsection (a)(3).  
 
`(c) EXCEPTIONS- (1) The requirements set forth in subsections 
(a)(3) and (b) shall not apply to any employee who, on October 1, 1991, 
has at least 10 years of experience in acquisition positions, in comparable 
positions in other government agencies or the private sector, or in similar 
positions in which an individual obtains experience directly relevant to the 
field of contracting. 
 
`(2) The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to 
any employee for purposes of qualifying to serve in the position in which 
the employee is serving on October 1, 1993, or any other position in the 
same grade and involving the same level of responsibilities as the position 
in which the employee is serving on such date.  
 
`(d) WAIVER- The acquisition career program board of a military 
department may waive any or all of the requirements of subsections (a) 
and (b) with respect to an employee of that military department if the 
board certifies that the employee possesses significant potential for 
advancement to levels of greater responsibility and authority, based on 
demonstrated job performance and qualifying experience. With respect to 
each waiver granted under this subsection, the board shall set forth in a 
written document the rationale for its decision to waive such requirements.  
The document shall be submitted to and retained by the Director of 
Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development.  [Ref 35] 
In essence, Section 1724 required commissioned officers and civilian GS -1102 
contract specialists to 1) complete mandatory contracting classes, 2) meet prescribed 
experience levels, and 3) either have a 4-year college degree, 24 Semester credits in 
business coursework, or pass and equivalency exam.  Noticeably absent from Section 
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1724 was any reference to the requirements for enlisted members of the military who 
were performing contracting actions simila r in scope to the GS-1102.  This policy, 
Chapter 87, remained in effect and unchanged until Section 808 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.  This new Act made several amendments to the 
original version.   
First, it amended paragraph 3 (A) by inserting the word “and” prior to (B) in that 
paragraph.  This essentially removed the option of either having a baccalaureate degree or 
24 semester credit hours of business related college courses and made them both a 
requirement.  It also removed the possibility of taking an examination that demonstrated 
the skills expected of an individual with 24 semester credits of college.  As a result all 
contracting officers and GS-1102 civilians, within the “Armed Forces”, are required to 
have a baccalaureate degree and 24 business credits.   
Secondly, it changed paragraph (b) “GS-1102 Series” by including “and similar 
military positions” in the title.  In effect, this change, which went into effect on October 
1, 2000, required all military, including enlisted personnel, to meet the same education 
qualifications as GS-1102 civilians, who were already required to meet the same 
education requirements as the contracting officers.  This requirement meant that military 
contacting personnel, of which, enlisted contingency contracting personnel were a subset, 
were required to have a baccalaureate degree to enter the workforce.  One of the major 
requirements to be a commissioned officer in the armed forces is having a baccalaureate 
degree, however, most enlisted personnel tend not to have a baccalaureate degree.  This 
meant that very few of the enlisted personnel performing contracting when Section 808 
was implemented were in compliance with its contents, unless they already met the 
exclusions of the statute.  [Ref 36] 
The most recent amendments to Title 10, subtitle A, Chapter 87, Section 1724 
gave military workforce members on additional avenue to comply with the statutory 
requirements to enter the contracting workforce.  Section 824 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 added a provision to Section 1724 for the 
Secretary to establish qualification requirements for the “Contingency Contracting 
Force”.  This exception to the education requirements allows the military an opportunity 
24 
to qualify to enter the contracting career field with either 24 semester credit hours in 
business, or passing an examination that demonstrates the skills, knowledge or abilities 
comparable to an individual who has completed at least 24 business hours.  The 
paragraph titled “Contingency Contracting Force” included below, essentially reduced 
the educational requirements for enlisted personnel, serving in the contingency 
contracting force, from a baccalaureate degree to just needing to meet the 24 semester 
hour credits of business related coursework, or pass and examination that demonstrates 
the abilities of someone with 24 hours of business college.  To date, DoD is in the 
process of developing a policy memorandum directing each service to develop an 
“examination” to satisfy this requirement.  [Ref 37] 
`(f) CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FORCE- The Secretary shall 
establish qualification requirements for the contingency contracting force 
consisting of members of the armed forces whose mission is to deploy in 
support of contingency operations and other operations of the Department 
of Defense, including— 
`(1) completion of at least 24 semester credit hours or the 
equivalent of study from an accredited institution of higher 
education or similar educational institution in any of the disciplines 
of accounting, business, finance, law, contracts, purchasing, 
economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative 
methods, or organization and management; or  
 
`(2) passing an examination that demonstrates skills, knowledge, or 
abilities comparable to that of an individual who has completed at 
least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of study in any of 
the disciplines described in paragraph (1).'.[Ref 37] 
These recent changes in section 1724 of Chapter 87 are a clear response to  the 
repeated comments in Table 2 that the DoD workforce required professional 
development.  In spite of the exceptions listed above, congress clearly equates college 
level education with improved professionalism within the acquisition community.  
In addition to the education and experience requirements, Section 1724 required 
contracting personnel to complete mandatory contracting courses for the grade level or 
position they are serving in. This was accomplished by adding Section 1205 “Defense 
Acquisition Un iversity Structure” to the Nation Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 
1991.  This section mandated that the Secretary of Defense to establish the Defense 
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Acquisition University no later than 1 October 1991.  This university was directed to 
develop a training curriculum to instruct contracting personnel in uniform contracting 
procedures by establishing: 
A coherent framework for the educational development of personnel in 
acquisition positions. Such framework shall cover courses of instruction 
from the basic level through intermediate and senior levels. [Ref 35]  
3. DoD 5000.52M Acquisition Career Development  
The Secretary of Defense responded to DAWIA by issuing DoD Directive 
5000.52 “Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program” 
on 25 October 1991.  This directive implemented the workforce requirements mandated 
by Chapter 87 of Title 10 U.S.C.  Subsequently, DoD 5000.52-M “Acquisition Career 
Development Program Manual” implemented the directive and gave explicit direction on 
how the Department of Defense would develop the necessary framework to achieve the 
standardization sought by congress.  [Ref 38] 
Essentially, the manual established three career levels of certification for 
members of the acquisition community.  Corresponding training, experience, and 
education requirements were established for each level.  The three levels established 
were:  Level 1 (Basic or Entry), Level II (Intermediate or Journeyman), and Level III 
(Advanced or Senior).  In addition, the manual requires each acquisition position to have 
a certification standard established for it.  Personnel desiring to fill an acquisition position 
within DoD must meet the certification standards established for it.  [Ref 38]  
The mandatory certification requirements for contracting personnel at these 3 
levels are listed in Table 3.  Incumbent contracting personnel are required to meet the 
listed requirements for their position within 18 months of being assigned to that position.  
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Table 3.   DAWIA Certification Requirements From: [Ref 39] 
 
4. Continuous Learning 
In addition to the DAWIA requirements discussed above, members of the 
acquisition workforce are also required to achieve 80 continuous learning point s within a 
two year period with a goal of achieving 40 points per fiscal year.  This policy was 
established in 1998 Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics.  The Under Secretary’s response was partially due  to the 
growing pressure to improve the professional development of the acquisition workforce, 
and partially due to the speed of change being experienced by the Acquisition 
community. 
As we move to more sophisticated processes and empower acquisition 
employees to assume greater responsibility, it is imperative that we couple 
these increased demands on the workforce with the kinds of training, 
education, and professional development that will enable them to assume 
these new roles.  Meeting increased performance expectations in the 
rapidly changing defense acquisition environment requires workforce 
members to be current with reforms, adaptable, flexible, and willing to 
accept risk and exercise leadership.  [Ref 40] 
This Memo established as a requirement that all members of the acquisition 
workforce attain at least 80 continuous learning points within a two-year period with the 
goal of 40 points during each fiscal year.  These points are tracked by each military 
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department, and like the DAWIA certification rates , are reported to the Office of the 
Under Secretary annually.  The point system for these continuous learning credits is listed 
in Table 4.  These are only guidelines and supervisors have flexibility in assigning points.  
DAU does offer a lot of continuous  learning courses, but additional funding is not 
provided for units to send personnel to this training.   
 
 
Table 4.   Continuous Learning Points From: [Ref 40]  
 
One final note on training that bears on the contingency contacting force is an 
optional course given by DAU called “CON 234”.  This course is specifically designed to 
educate Military members on contracting policies and procedures used while in a foreign 
country.  Topics covered in this course include: waivers to DoD policies, exemptions 
from certain regulations, increased purchasing authorities, and cultural differences.  
These topics combine to create a unique environment that gives contracting personnel 
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increased authority, more responsibility, and for flexibility to support their mission than 
they would normally have when contracting in the garrison environment.  [Ref 39]  
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter began with a thorough examination of the historical perspectives that 
led to the evolution of contingency contracting.  The trend towards contingency 
contracting has been steadily moving forward since the founding of this country.  The 
chapter then examined many of the reasons current literature reports as the drivers 
propelling this increasing reliance on contingency contracting to support the military 
deployments seen today.  These two sections of chapter II were included to give a 
historical perspective to the study and to support the notion that contingency contracting 
will continue well into the foreseeable future.  The reader should now how a basic 
understanding of what contingency contracting is, how it evolved in this country and how 
likely it is to continue to be a viable force multiplier in future military operations.   
The last section of Chapter II examined several studies that have been conducted 
by various commissions and what their recommendations were regarding personnel 
development.  Although these commissions had many wide-reaching recommendations 
involving almost every aspect of the department of defense, the information presented 
was specifically related to the weaknesses these commissions found in relation to 
personnel issues that resulted in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA).  This Act laid the groundwork for the current contingency contracting 
framework within the DoD, with an understanding of the historical and regulatory 
context of contingency contracting the following chapter evaluates how each of the 
military services has structured its response to these challenges.   
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with an examination of current Marine Corps policy 
governing the organization and employment of enlisted Marine contingency contracting 
personnel.  This examination will include a brief exploration of the education, training, 
and career development of Marines within the 3044 Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS).  After examining the approach the Marine Corps has taken, the same issues will 
be evaluated within the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The goal here is to give the reader 
an understanding of how each Service deals with their particular need for contingency 
contracting.   
B. MARINE CORPS APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
1. Organization of Contracting Force  
The contingency contracting force within the United States Marine Corps is 
organized to support the needs of deployed units of various sizes and is guided in this 
effort by Marine Corps Order 4200.15F, Marine Corps Purchasing Procedures Manual, 
Appendix B.  The Marine Corps concept of employment calls for both enlisted and 
commissioned offic ers to perform the many varied missions expected of contingency 
contracting personnel.  Unlike the Navy and the Army, the Marine Corps does not 
currently utilize its civilian contracting personnel to support contingency operations.  
[Ref 40]  Appendix A lists all the commissioned contracting billets within the Marine 
Corps and Appendix B lists all the enlisted contracting billets within the Marine Corps.   
There are currently 19 billets for Marine Corps commissioned contracting officers 
filled by Marine officers with the rank of Captain through Lieutenant Colonel.  These 
officers have attended the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and received a Master of 
Science degree in Management with an emphasis on contracting.  Upon graduation from 
NPS these Marine offic ers are given the secondary MOS of 9656 and assigned to one of 
the available 19 billets for a 3-year “payback tour”.  At the conclusion of their payback 
tour these officers return to their primary MOS and continue their career.  Only a few are 
given an opportunity for a second tour in contracting.  Of these 19 billets, only three are 
identified as “contingency contracting” billets, and are located at each of the three 
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Contingency Contracting Offices in the Supply Battalion of the Forces Service Support 
Groups (FSSGs).  In addition, the Contingency Contracting Offices include eight enlisted 
3044 Marines whose roles are to support contingency contracting operations.  Since the 
9656 Marine officers are outside the scope of this thesis, they are briefly mentione d to aid 
the reader in understanding how the Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Offices are 
structured and how Marines are employed within that structure.  The relatively small 
number of 9656 officers means that generally most deployments for exercises o r 
operations are supported by enlisted 3044s, while the 9656 are employed in large Joint or 
Marine Corps contingency operations and exercises.  [Ref 41]  
There are approximately 116 enlisted Marines who hold the 3044 MOS - all 
capable of deploying in support of contingency operations.  However, the 24 Marines 
located at one of the three FSSGs are the only enlisted Marines considered to be in an 
immediate “deployable” status as operationally that is their role.  The remaining 3044 
MOS Marines within the Marine Corps are assigned to either a “base” or “staff” billet 
and are typically given responsibilities that prevent them from deploying.  Therefore, 
when the need arises for a contingency contracting Marine to support a deployment that 
Marine will most likely come from one of the three FSSGs.  All 3044s are capable of 
deploying.  Once the 3044s in the Contingency Contracting Offices are exhausted, then 
the 3044s assigned to the RCOs are tapped.  If the FSSGs are unable to support a 
contingency contracting personnel request, due to their limited number of Marines, that 
request can be filled by base Marines with the approval of their OIC or passed to another 
military Srvice for support.  [Ref 42]  
With the components of the Marine Corps contingency contracting forc e 
identified, this study now examines how these Marines fit into the organizational 
structure of the Marine Corps operating forces.  The diagrams that follow begin with a 
broad view of Marine Corps organizational structure and then drill down through the 
layers that contain the Marine Corps contracting personnel and eventually end up with 
the contingency contracting personnel.   
Figure 1 depicts the overall structure of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and 
its relationship to the Geographic Combatant Comm ander.  The Marine Corps has three 
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Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF); I MEF, Camp Pendleton CA; II MEF, Camp 
Lejeune NC; and III MEF, Okinawa Japan.  Figure 1 also depicts the way the Marine 
Corps task organizes its Marine Air -Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) and includes the 
personnel strength devoted to military operations of various sizes.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Marine Corps Organizational Chart From: [Ref 43] 
 
It is within the Force Service Support Group under the MEF that the contingency 
contracting Marines are located.  Figure 2 depicts the basic organization of the FSSG.  
Since the function of the contingency contracting Marines is closely related to the job 
performed by the supply personnel within the FSSG, the 3044 Marines fall within the 

















Figure 2.   Marine Corps Force Service Support Group From: [Ref 44]  
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Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the command structure for the Sup ply 
Battalion within the FSSG.  It is at this point in the examination of the Marine Corps 
command structure that variations begin to appear in the chain of command for the 3044s 












Figure 3.   Supply Battalion Organization From: [Ref 44]  
 
Although each of the FSSGs assign their 3044 Marines to the Supply Company 
within the Supply Battalions, the relationship between the contracting Marines and the 
Supply Company varies among the three FSSGs.  The next section describes the 
differences found in the relationships each of the contingency contracting sections have 
with the Supply Company within the FSSG, and the local Regional Contracting Office 
(RCO) that provides in-garrison contracting support to the Base. 
2. FSSG Relationship with the Regional Contracting Office  
Each of the three FSSG Contingency Contracting Offices are located aboard a 
Marine Corps Base.  Also aboard each of these bases, is a Marine Corps Regional 
Contracting Office (RCO).  Although the structure of each RCO is slightly different, in 
terms of its personnel, the basic configuration of an RCO consists of a 9656 officer or 
senior civilian in charge of approximately 12 contracting Marines (3044) and 
approximately 20 civilian contracting personnel.  The civilians and Marines assigned to 
the RCO are responsible for all the contracting activity necessary to support base 
operations or Marine units within their geographic region.  [Ref 42]  
The relationship between the 1st FSSG Contingency Contracting Office and the 
RCO Southwest located at Camp Pendleton CA. can be characterized as one of beneficial 
cohabitation.  The Contingency Contracting Office is co-located with the RCO.  
Contracting authority provided to the Contingency Contracting Office is for contracting 
actions while on deployment only.  Thus, this symbiotic relationship affords an 
environment where the contingency contracting 3044s can exercise their contracting 
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skills on a regular basis.  This arrangement between the two organiz ations permits the 
RCO to distribute assignments to the FSSG contracting Marines, and in turn provides 
valuable training that can be used while performing deployed contracting.  Generally the 
scope and amount of work that can be assigned under this relatio nship is limited to small 
contracts that are usually short in duration that normally fall below the Simplified 
Acquisition Procedure (SAP) threshold or those under FAR 13.5, Commercial Items.  
This training is invaluable since the majority of purchases per formed during contingency 
operations is accomplished under SAP or FAR 13.5.  Ultimately, the FSSG retains total 
operational control over these Marines.  If larger contracts were given to the FSSG 
Marines and they were given orders to deploy, the garrison c ontracts being administered 
by the FSSG Marines would suffer.  This arrangement is, however, mutually beneficial to 
both parties.  The FSSG Marines get training they would not have access to if their 
offices were located with the FSSG headquarters and the RCO gets additional labor to 
help with its workload.  [Ref 42] 
The relationship between the 2nd FSSG and the RCO at Camp Lejeune, NC is 
slightly different.  Although the FSSG Marines share an office with the RCO, they 
operate more independently from the RCO.  As a consequence, the FSSG Marines 
receive less access to base contracts so their “hands on experience” with base contracts is 
more limited than that received by the FSSG Marines at Camp Pendleton.  This 
relationship is still very beneficial to both parties for reasons similar to those given for 
the 2nd FSSG and RCO Southwest.  [Ref 45]  
The relationship between the RCO Okinawa, Japan and the 3rd FSSG is different 
than the previous FSSG/RCO relationships.  Here the FSSG contracting Marines are 
assigned to the RCO under a Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) as category I FAPs.  The 
FAP provides the RCO Chief of the Contracting Office (CCO) more control over the 
FSSG 3044 Marines.  As a result, the RCO CCO is able to assign larger contracts and 
more responsibility to the FSSG 3044s.  The CCO has more direct influence in 
determining which 3044 is deployed, and consequently can weigh current workload 
against providing the required training and experience.  The RCO CCO has the option of 
sending a 3044 that is assigned to the FSSG or the RCO proper and in essence provides 
direct support from his office to the MEF for deployed contracting personnel.  The 
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increased influence exercised by the RCO is beneficial to the RCO in that it gives the 
RCO 3044 an opportunity to deploy and gain valuable experience supporting deployed 
units while giving the FSSG Marines the ability to work larger contracts thereby 
increasing their skills at administering more complicated and challenging contracts.  [Ref 
45] 
3. 3044 MOS Requirements  
With an understanding of the command relationships that contingency contracting 
personnel fall under, this study now examines the process used to create a Marine 
assigned the 3044 MOS.  It is important to note here that there is no difference in the 
training and education given to contingency and base enlisted contracting Marines.  The 
only thing that differentiates a contingency contracting enlisted Marine from a base or 
garrison contracting enlisted Marine is the billet to which they are assigned.  As 
mentioned previously, all the enlisted Marines with the 3044 MOS are capable of 
deploying.  The contingency or FSSG Marines are simply in a “deployable” billet and 
hence are the first choice when the need for a deployed contracting Marine arises.   
Enlisted Marines do not enter into the 3044 MOS directly from basic training.  
Instead, enlisted Marines generally from the supply field and possessing the rank of 
sergeant or higher apply for acceptance into the 3044 MOS.  The Marine Corps MOS 
Manual lists the following criteria for Marines to be selected into the MOS: 
a. Summary.  Purchasing and contracting specialists perform various 
duties incident to the acquisition of supplies and non-personal 
services purchased via open market from commercial and 
Government sources.  Marines in this MOS must have the ability 
to work independently and be objective in applying purchasing and 
contracting laws and regulations in daily activities.   
b. Requirements/Prerequisites  
(1) CL (clerical) score of 110 or higher. 
(2) Must be interviewed and recommended by the Regional 
Contracting Officer. 
35 
(3) Must be at least a sergeant with less than 2 years time in 
grade (waiverable to corporal) on second or subsequent 
enlistment with primary MOS 3043 (Primary MOS 3043 
may be waived, on a case-by-case basis, when 
recommended by Regional Contracting Officer) 
(4) No convictions by court-martial, civilian courts, or 
nonjudicial punishment of any act involving larceny, fraud, 
or theft. 
(5) Must have excellent communicative skills, both verbally 
and in writing. 
(6) Have a minimum of 36 months of obligated service upon 
assignment  of intended MOS of 3044.  
(7) Be able to type 45 words per minute, and have a general 
aptitude for computers.   
(8) Lateral move requests shall be approved through OccFld 
sponsor (Code LBO). 
(9) Marines who lateral-move into this MOS from outside 
OccFld 30 will be assigned MOS 3000 with an intended 
MOS of 3044.  All Marines will be assigned to a Regional 
Contracting Office for a period of 6 months for On the Job 
Training (OJT).  At the completion of OJT and upon the 
recommendation of the Regional Contracting Officer, these 
Marines will be assigned MOS 3044.  [Ref 46]  
4. Education  
The Statutory DAWIA requirements, described at the end of Chapter II of this 
study, namely to have a baccalaureate degree and 24 semester credit hours of business 
related college coursework to enter the contracting force, applies to all Marines in the 
3044 MOS.  As a result an effort is made to recruit Marines that already have college 
courses under their belt.  However, there is no requirement for enlisted Marines within 
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the supply or logistics fields to attend college classes while they are in those other fields.  
As a result many of the Marines entering the 3044 MOS must attend college classes 
outside normal work hours to meet the DAWIA education requirements.  [Ref 41] 
Under DAWIA, education requirements are mandatory by law.  However, 
DAWIA also includes a provision to reimburse civilian and military members for their 
college tuition expenses under the Acquisition Workforce Tuition Assista nce Program 
(AWTAP).  This provision, however, only applies to enlisted personnel permanently 
assigned the 3044 MOS.  Marines in an On-the-Job Training (OJT) status were not 
eligible for the DAWIA tuition assistance because they are not considered to be pa rt of 
the acquisition workforce until they completed this OJT period.  Their only option was to 
utilize the Marine Corps tuition assistance program available to all active duty military 
personnel.  Until recently, the Marine Corps Tuition Assistance Program only provided 
for 75% of the tuition costs.  Marines in an OJT status were, therefore, expected to pay 
for 25% of the tuition and for any required textbooks out of pocket.  Beginning 1 October 
2002, the Marine Corps tuition assistance program now pays 100% of tuition for Marines 
attending college courses, although Marines must still pay for the cost of textbooks out of 
pocket.  [Ref 47] 
5. Training 
Enlisted Marines began their career as a 3044 MOS contract specialist through 
assignment to an RCO to comple te a six-month training period of OJT.  Until recently, 
Marines in this OJT program were assigned a temporary MOS of 3000.  This resulted in 
long time delays for Marines trying to get registered for courses.  As a result, Marines are 
now assigned to a TO/Line number associated with an acquisition billet as soon as they 
are assigned to the OJT program.  This permits the OJT Marine to register for the Level I 
contracting courses, which reduces the amount of time it takes to complete the Level I 
requirements - since most of the courses are on-line.  Upon successful completion of the 
OJT period, and with the approval of the RCO CCO, the Marine is assigned the 3044 
MOS.  Once the permanent MOS is obtained, Marines are eligible to receive centralized 
funding to attend DAU courses and to obtain tuition assistance for their college courses 
under AWTAP.  [Ref 47]  
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OJT Marines are typically assigned to the small purchase branch within the RCO 
to learn how the Government contracting process works by shadowing a contract 
specialist with experience.  This training is informal with no established criteria that must 
be followed.  The training is completely left in the hands of the contract specialist 
(civilian or Marine) that is given the responsibility of training the OJT Ma rine.  During 
this one-on-one training, the OJT Marine is given instructions on how to fill out various 
contracting forms and educated on the Government contracting process in general.  The 
contract specialist gives the OJT Marine tasks from actual contrac ts the specialist has 
been assigned.  The trainer reviews any OJT work and corrects and explains mistakes.  
The CCO authorizes the OJT 3044 to be assigned a permanent 3044 MOS only when the 
contract specialist conducting the training is convinced the train ee has mastered the basic 
contracting skills necessary to be granted the MOS.  [Ref 41]  
Once the Marine is assigned the 3044 MOS the Marine can then register to attend 
resident DAU training courses that are fully funded.  Marines can register to attend DAU  
courses without DAU funding while in an OJT status however, limited unit funding and a 
low priority for the limited number of seats make this virtually infeasible.  In addition, 
many RCOs have a policy not to send OJT Marines to DAU courses until they hav e 
completed their six months of OJT.  After attending CON 100, 101, and 104 Marines 
meet the basic training requirements for Level I certification.  Table 5 indicates the 
current Marine Corps certification rates for the three levels of certification.  [Ref  41] 
Headquarters Marine Corps attributes the low number of personnel certified to the 
requirement for enlisted personnel to have a baccalaureate degree which few enlisted 
Marines have.  In addition, the Marine Corps has had difficulty in getting 3044’s in to 
courses at DAU.  A major reason for this is the long backlog of personnel from all the 
branches of the Service trying to get their personnel trained through DAU.  [Ref 41]  
6. Continuous Learning 
Until recently, receiving the Level I certification initia ted the 2-year clock for 
acquiring the 80 continuous learning points as mandated by the Under Secretary of 
Defense Memorandum discussed in Chapter II.  [Ref 40]  A subsequent Memo from the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) released on 13 
September 2002 made the requirement applicable to all members of the acquisition 
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workforce regardless of certification status or level.  [Ref 49]  According to the 3044 
Community Manager, Headquarters Marine Corps, the Navy’s Director Acquis ition 
Career Management (DACM) has yet to implement this policy, but is expected to do so 



















I 8 4 50% 33 19 57.6% 
II 100 82 82% 75 56 74.7% 
III 63 48 76.2% 3 1 33.2% 
Total 171 133 77% 111 76 68.5% 
  
Table 5.   Marine Corps DAWIA Certification Level From: [Ref 48]  
 
Only a few of the larger RCOs such as Camp Pendleton, Quantico, and Okinawa 
can fill enough seats (minimum of 12 acquisition workforce members) to host centrally 
funded or command-unique continuous learning courses.  The smaller contracting offices 
rarely have the minimum number of qualified students to obtain this external fundin g and 
must, therefore, pay for continuous learning with unit funds.  This places commanders in 
a difficult position of determining how much of their budget to commit to training while 
trying to satisfy all the other competing requirements for their scarce resources.  [Ref 50] 
Generally, tracking of continuous learning is not accomplished within the Marine 
Corps.  Only a few of the contracting offices, such as Camp Pendleton, Barstow, and 
Okinawa, provide local tracking of continuous learning.  The Marine Co rps relies on the 
Navy’s web site for acquisition training applications to register for DAU and Continuous 
Learning courses and tracking of Continuous Learning credits.  At present, the only 
source of feedback the Marine Corps has from the Navy DACM is a consolidated 
percentage that lumps all civilian and military acquisition workforce personnel from all 
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acquisition career fields together.  Table 6 contains the most recent Navy wide statistics 












NAVFAC 1156 268 23% 62%
MSC 85 13 15% 58%
MARINE CORPS 618 61 10% 51%
ONR 84 14 17% 44%
ALL OTHERS 920 91 10% 40%
NAVSEA 3724 329 9% 35%
NAVSUP 1574 170 11% 35%
NAVAIR 7386 488 7% 32%
SPAWAR 1167 119 10% 30%
BUMED 115 9 8% 23%
SSP 276 7 3% 13%
DON Total 17105 1615 9% 36%  
Table 6.   Total Navy Continuous Learning Statistics From: [Ref 48] 
 
As the table indicates, the total Marine Corps acquisition workforce consists of 
618 civilians and military members in all acquisition related fields.  The 114 enlisted 
Marines with the 3044 MOS are inclu ded in this total of 618.  According to the table only 
10% of the total Marine Corps acquisition workforce achieved the goal of 80 continuous 
learning points as of January 1, 2002.  At present this total cannot be broken down to 
reflect data related to the contracting workforce, thus there is no mechanism to identify 
the actual percentage of 3044s that are compliant or participate in the Continuous 
Learning Program.   
7. Employment 
As mentioned, enlisted 3044 Marines are assigned to either a base or a 
contingency contracting billet.  Those Marines assigned to a base unit are employed in 
accordance with their rank and years of experience.  This is done informally with no 
Marine Corps specific milestones that determine a Marine’s level of experience.  Junior 
Marines new to the field are typically given small routine contracts that require minimal 
paperwork and with heavy oversight by experienced contracting personnel.  As Marines 
gain experience and increase their level of competency they are given larger dolla r value 
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contracts and less oversight.  Eventually, senior enlisted Marines will become managers 
of the small purchase or large contracts sections within a large RCO or Section leaders 
for one of the Contingency Contracting sections.  [Ref 47]  
Marines deploy either as a permanent member of a Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) or as a temporary member of a mission specific exercise or contingency 
command.  The Marines assigned to the MEU are attached to the MEU Service Support 
Group (MSSG).  This is typically a one-year assignment characterized by a six -month 
“workup” or training phase followed by a six -month deployment phase.  Enlisted 
Marines assigned to a MEU typically provide contracting support once the Marine 
Ground Combat Element (GCE) deploys as part of an exercise or contingency operation 
on foreign shores.  [Ref 51] 
The other method of employing contingency contracting Marines is as a member 
of a specific contingency or training event conducted in a foreign country.  This can be as 
a member of a Joint Task Force (JTF) or as a member of a Marine Corps specific event.  
Contracting Marines are involved in the planning stage for an event, deploy with the 
advance party to establish contracts with vendors, and close out contracts at the end of the 
deployment.  [Ref 52] 
C. AIRFORCE APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
1. Organizational Structure  
Like the Marine Corps, the United States Air Force contracting workforce 
consists of commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian contracting specialists.  
Figure 4 shows the number of personnel within each category from Fiscal Year 1995 
through 2000.  The Figure clearly indicates a reduction in workforce strength of about 
500 personnel in a short five-year period, but enlisted numbers are relatively stable.   
With the exception of Air Force commissioned officers being permanently 
assigned to the contracting field for their career, and being assigned to the MOS upon 
entering the service, vice getting a temporary MOS later in their career like Marine 
officers, the requirements to become a contracting officer in the Air Force are similar to 
those for Marine contracting officers.  Since the officer community is outside the scope 
of this study, Air Force officers will only be mentioned when doing so aids the 
41 
understanding of enlisted contracting personnel within the Air Force.  Likewise, the 
civilians within the Air Force workforce are outside the scope of this thesis and will not 
be discussed  [Ref 54]  
 
AIR FORCE CONTRACTING WORKFORCEAIR FORCE CONTRACTING WORKFORCE
FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00
Officers    1,017 1,001           1,003   1,083  1,079*         1100*
Enlisted           1,209 1,261 1,268 1,251 1,236          1,256
Civilians 6,249 6,177 6,064 5,965 5,755 5,635
Total                8,475 8,439 8,335 8,299 8,070          7,991
*Includes 138 (FY99) and 157 (FY00) core 64P officers curre ntly in career broadening   
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Figure 4.   Air Force Contracting Workforce. From: [Ref 53] 
 
The Air Force, which has a much larger pool of contracting personnel in 
comparison to the Marine Corps, is organized into a more centralized structure.  Whereas 
the Marine Corps separates its contingency contracting personnel and its garrison 
contracting personnel into two separate command structures, the Air Force combines 
them into more centralized organizations with all of its enlisted personnel capable of 
performing both the garrison and the contingency functions at any given time.  [Ref 54]  
To accomplish this integrated approach the Air Force organizes its personnel into 
contracting wings that are further broken down into contracting squadrons that contain 
42 
two acquisition flights.  Each flight contains two contracting teams with five members 
and one team leader.  The organizational structure of these contracting squadrons is 
depicted in Figure 5.  Notice that the contingency contracting cell is not permanently 
manned.  When the need arises to support contingency operations personnel are pulled 
from the contingency teams and temporarily assigned to the contingency contracting cell 
for the duration of the contingency and then return to their respective teams when the 
contingency is concluded.  [Ref 54] 
Each contracting team is composed of a mixture of experienced and 
inexperienced personnel – both enlisted and officers.  The workload for team members is 
comprised of garrison type contracts that are managed by the acquisition flight leader and 
the team leader.  When a team member is scheduled to deploy in support of a 
contingency or exercise that member’s workload is reassigned to other team or flight 
personnel.  This system permits the team members to be fully employed on garrison type 
contracts while not deployed and ensures that when they do deploy contracts are not 
dropped or left incomplete.  [Ref 54]  
2. Enlisted Contracting AFSC Requirements  
Unlike the Marine Corps, enlisted jobs in the Air Force are called Air Force 
Specialty Codes (AFSC).  Also differing from the Marine Corps, the Air Force assigns a 
series of progressive AFSCs to its enlisted personnel, whereas the Marine Corps assigns 
only one MOS to its enlisted personnel for the duration of their career.  The AFSC 
consists of five alphanumeric characters that are coded to represent different aspects of 
the job.  The Air Force assigns the following AFSCs to its personnel: 6C000, 6C011, 
6C031, 6C051, 6C071, and 6C091.  The 4 th number in the AFSC represents the 
individual’s skill level.  These different skill levels are based on several factors such as 
rank, time in a certain level, and additional training.  The requirements for entry into this 
AFSC are listed below:   
Knowledge .  Knowledge is mandatory of: pricing techniques, market trends, 
supply sources, US or foreign commercial practices and marketing factors 
contributing to prices of items, equipment, materials or services.  Knowledge is 
mandatory of basic computer applications, audit procedures, policies, laws, and 
directives governing purchasing and contingency contracting policies and 
procedures.  
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Education.   For entry into this specialty, completion of 24 semester hours in 
business related subjects, such as accounting, business finance, law, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, 
and organization and management is desirable, or possession of a baccalaureate 
degree. 
Training.  The following training is mandatory for award of the AFSC indicated: 
6C031. Completion of the apprentice contracting specialist course.   
6C071. Achievement of Level II Certification in contracting under the 
Acquisition Professional Development Program, and completion of Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) contingency contracting course (CON 234).  
Experience.  The following experience is mandatory for award of the AFSC 
indicated: 
6C051. in and possession of AFSC 6C031. Also, experience in functions such as 
assisting and performing duties involved in simplified acquisition procedures, 
negotiations, and other approved methods.  
6C071. Qualification in and possession of AFSC 6C051. Also, experience in 
contracting for commodities, services, construction and contract administration.  
Ability to perform Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) duties.  
6C091. Qualification in and possession of AFSC 6C071.  
Other. The following are mandatory as indicated: 
For entry into this specialty, ability to communicate effectively in writing.  
For entry, award, and retention of these AFSCs:  
Ability to speak distinctly. 
Never convicted of a felony. Never been convicted by court-martial or never have 
received nonjudicial punishment for dereliction in the performance of duties 
involving contracting activities, larceny, misappropriation of government funds or 
property or financial irresponsibility.  
Strength Req: G 
Physical Profile 333233 
Citizenship No 
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Required Appitude Score: G-70 
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Figure 5.   Air Force Contracting Squadron Organization. From: [Ref 53] 
 
Unlike the Marine Corps, which assigns the contracting MOS as a secondary or 
follow-on MOS, the Air Force contracting AFSC is an entry level one for the their 
enlisted Airmen.  Although enlisted personnel can enter the AFSC later in their career, 
most Airmen enter the contracting field straight out of basic training.  These enlisted 




3. Career Development 
With a lager population and an entry-level base, the Air Force has been able to 
develop a structured approach to its career development.  The document that guides this 
career development process is the AFSC 6C0X1 Contracting Career Field Education and 
Training Plan (CFETP).  This document clearly establishes milestones that must be met 
for an individual to progress from one contracting level to the next.  Also contained 
within this document is the Contracting Career Field: Enlisted Career Path Pyramid 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Contracting Career Field: Enlisted Career Path Pyramid From: [Ref 56]  
 
In addition to the three DAWIA certification levels described in Chapter II, the 
Air Force assigns skill levels to its contracting personnel.  The CFETP contains a detailed 
and comprehensive checklist that outlines all the requirements that must be completed for 
each skill level.  This checklist gets initialed by the individual being trained, the trainer 
conducting the training, and a certifier that has attended a training certification course.  
Once an individual has received all the required signatures for a level, training can begin 
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for the next level.  These skill levels are intended to ensure a standard level of experience 
across the contracting field for the purpose of making assignments  [Ref 56] 
4. Education 
Like the Marine Corps, the Air Force enlisted personnel are subject to the same 
education requirements outlined in Chapter II.  As Figure 7 shows, the Air Force is 
struggling to get its enlisted members through college courses to meet this requirement 
(15% of enlisted personnel have bachelor degrees).  Since the Air Force considers all of 
its enlisted personnel to be in the contingency contracting force, they are able to bring 
enlisted members into the field and can employ them as c ontracting specialists, but must 
get them through college courses to receive certification through DAWIA.  [Ref 54]  
 
YEARS E-4 & FY 00
EXPERIENCE**     E-9    E-8 E-7 E-6 E-5 AMN TOTAL 
%
0 - 5 0 1 11 45 168        239              464 38%
6 - 10 0 2 29 48 117 53 249 20%
11 - 15 0 2 75 151 90 5 323 26%
16 - 20 3 22 51 53 31 0 160 13%
OVER 20 11 9 18 2 0 0 40 3%
** Depicts total years in Service
HIGHEST
EDUCATION E-4 & FY 00
LEVEL E-9 E-8 E-7 E-6 E-5 AMN TOTAL %
HIGH SCHOOL 0 0 0   0 1 32 33 3%
SOME COLLEGE 4 15 117 246 364 241 987 80%
BACHELORS 9 15 54 50 41 24 193 15%
MASTERS 0 6 13 3 0 0 23 2%
DOCTORAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Source:  AFPC
EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION OF AIR FORCE 
CONTRACTING WORKFORCE - ENLISTED
(AFSC 6C0X1)
FOR FY 99* 
EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION OF AIR FORCE 
CONTRACTING WORKFORCE - ENLISTED
(AFSC 6C0X1)






















*FY 00 data not available due to in-process data base changes.  Tables will be 
updated when information becomes available. 
 




Like the other branches of the military, the Air Force has an Air -Force-wide 
tuition assistance program that pays 100% of the tuition costs for its Service members 
that volunteer to attend college courses for personal improvement.  This program is 
applicable to any type of college cours e the enlisted members want to take, but only 
covers the cost of tuition.  Lab fees, books, and other course materials must be paid for by 
the individual and are not reimbursed under this program.  Because of the mandatory 
nature of the DAWIA requirements, the Air Force has an additional tuition assistance 
program for its acquisition personnel.  This program covers all the costs associated with 
business courses taken to meet the DAWIA requirements and therefore places no 
financial hardship on the enlisted m ember.  [Ref 57] 
5. Training 
In addition to sending its enlisted personnel to DAU courses, the Air Force 
conducts its own contracting training courses at Lackland AFB.  Table 7 indicates the 
timeline for attendance at Air Force and DAU training courses.   
Upon graduation from Basic Training, enlisted personnel attend contracting 
apprentice school at Lackland AFB.  Enlisted personnel are then assigned to one of the 
Air Force Contracting Squadrons.  There the apprentice completes OJT core training and 
the two Contracting Career Development Courses (CDCs) within a 12-month period.  
Completion of these three courses gives equivalency for CON 101.  Air Force enlisted 
personnel then attend the remaining courses for DAWIA certification at DAU.  After 
completion of CON 104 and meeting the education requirements discussed above the 
enlisted member is granted Level I DAWIA certification and attends CON 234 and 
begins taking the CON 202/204/210 sequence of DAU courses required for Level II 




Table 7.   Air Force Enlisted Personnel Timeline for Training From: [Ref 56]  
 
The guiding document for Air Force contingency contracting, Air Force Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix CC, places an additional 
training requirement upon enlisted as well as commissioned members of the Air Force 
Contingency Contracting Workforce.  The AFFARS Appendix CC states the following: 
Appropriate training shall be provided to all contracting officers 
designated to support contingency operations.  Contingency Operational 
Contracting Support Plan (COCSP) training may be included as a part of 
the training required by AFI 64-102, Operational Contracting.  COCSP 
training should be provided to key personnel of major customer activities 
having contingency contracting support requirements.  [Ref 58] 
As a result of this requirement, major Air Force contracting commands have 
developed comprehensive training programs specifically designed to sharpen the skills of 
deploying personnel.  This cyclic training is conducted in three phases during a 12-month 
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period.  This training consists of lectures, practical exercises and military skills.  The 
practical exercises consist of scenarios based on after action reports and are tailored to the 
unit’s area of responsibility.  Training is conducted for one eight hour period per month.  
Newly arriving personnel are assigned to one of four training teams.  Each team has a 
mixture of officers and enlisted personnel of varying degrees of rank and experience.  
Team members participate in at least two cycles of training.  [Ref 54] 
During these training cycles, Air Force contracting personnel sharpen their skills 
in preparation for a biannual event called Air Force Top Dollar (AFTD).  This 
competition began in December of 1992 as a competition for Air Force comptrollers.  It 
became an Air Force-wide competition by 1994 and included contracting personnel for 
the first time in 1995.  The teams now consist of five comptrollers and two contingency 
contracting personnel.  These teams compete at  local levels and then move to regional, 
district and finally to the Air Force level.  The competition is focused around scenarios 
that teams must navigate through, but also tests military skills such as marksmanship, 
NBC skills, and physical fitness.  In July of 2001 the Air Force comptroller and 
contracting communities developed a standard set of training tools for teams to use in 
preparation for AFTD.  These tools are located on the AFTD web site.  [Ref 59]  
6. Continuous Learning 
Currently the Air Force does not have a Service-wide tracking system to track 
how well the Air Force is complying with the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) policy 
described in Chapter II.  As a result, no statistics are available to determine how well the 
Air Force is meeting the 80 hours of Continuous Learning.  The Air Force is currently 
testing a system that is derived from the Navy system.  The Air Force system is expected 
to be released sometime in early calendar year 2003.  [Ref 59]  
7. Employment 
The Air Force method of employing personnel to support contingency contracting 
deployments is based on Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statements and Unit 
Type Codes (UTC).  A DOC statement is prepared by the parent Major Command 
(MAJCOM) and includes information about the unit’s full wartime capability based upon 
the authorized manpower and materiel strength of the unit.  The DOC Statements are 
based on written requests and updated or changed as required.  This statement simply 
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defines the supposed capability of a unit and the resources required to provide that 
capability.  [Ref 54] 
The UTC is a five character alphanumeric code that identifies a force package 
designed to provide a specific capability.  It is a standard communications symbol used in 
the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Contingency 
Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System (COMPES) automated systems.  The 
UTC can be as small as one person or as large as a carrier battlegroup.  The UTCs can be 
either independent or dependent.  I ndependent UTCs are designed to operate alone and be 
self-sufficient.  Dependent UTCs are dependent on other sources for support to fulfill 
their capability.  Enlisted contracting personnel do not deploy in support of a contingency 
contracting operation until they are at least a skill level five.  Appendix C contains the 
current listing of Air Force UTCs.  [Ref 54]  
D. ARMY APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
The United States Army is currently in a transition period with respect to the way 
it utilizes its enlisted personnel to support contingency contracting operations.  The 
Army, which assigns its enlisted and commissioned personnel an MOS like the Marine 
Corps, does not have a permanent MOS for enlisted contracting personnel.  The Army 
does have a permanent MOS for commissioned officers working in the contracting field 
and these officers deploy on contingency contracting missions.  Figure 8 shows the 
current organizational structure for the United States Army Contracting Agency.   
Contingency contracting officers deploy from these commands to support 
operations around the world.  Commands with an asterisk indicate units where enlisted 
personnel will be assigned once a permanent MOS is developed.  Contingency 
contracting officers deploy from these major commands to support contingency 
contracting missions.  [Ref 62] 
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Figure 8.   U.S. Army Contracting Agency Headquarters. From: [Ref 61]  
 
Although the Army depends primarily upon commissioned officers to perform its 
contingency contracting missions, it does utilize enlisted personnel in the contracting 
field, but contracting is not their primary duty.  Members of the Army Quartermaster 
Branch select highly skilled and trained NCOs, above the rank of Sergeant, to be 
members of the Army’s Enlisted Acquisition and Technology Workforce (A&TWF).  
Once selected these NCOs attend CON 101, CON 104, and Contingency Contracting 234 
CON 100 is taken on-line).  After completing these three courses, these soldiers are given 
the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI): G1 (Contract Agent).  These enlisted workforce 
members receive the same training, education, and professional development 
opportunities as their officer and Department of the Army civilian counterparts.  [Ref 63]  
Soldiers must meet the following prerequisites to be considered elig ible for the 
G1 ASI: 
Prerequisites to be considered for favorable enrollment in the Acquisition 
Corps workforce include: 
Individual should be affiliated with the QM Branch preferably 92A or 92Y 
Grade E5 through E9  
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Demonstrated outstanding performance of assigned duties. (not 
waiverable). Recommended in writing by an officer in the candidate's 
chain of command in the rank of LTC or higher (Volunteers only - not 
waiverable)  
Exhibit stability in personal affairs as outlined in AR 600-20 (not 
waiverable)  
No punishment by UCMJ during the years preceding the nomination and 
no history of frequent UCMJ punishments. (not waiverable)  
Must have a minimum of 3 years of service remaining upon completion of 
Level I Certification criteria  
Must meet height and weight standards (not waiverable)  
Must be competitive for promotion (not waiverable)  
Must have a Baccalaureate degree and 24 semester hours in business 
management, accounting, finance, law, economics, marketing, purchasing, 
quantitative methods, industrial management, or organization and 
management. DANTES or CLEP equivalency exams may be included) 
(waiverable) ALL ENLISTED SOLDIERS entering the Acquisition 
Workforce Program will participate in local training plans which include 
numerous training rotations and civ ilian education requirements.  
Must be basic course graduate or selectee (not waiverable)  
GT 110 or higher (waiverable)  
Must maintains a security clearance  
Be a SGT or higher with 15 years of service or less. (waiverable)  
Have a successful tour in a leadership position (waiverable)  
Not assigned to back-to-back special duty assignments (waiverable)  
PERMS review conducted, no derogatory information found (i.e. GO 
Letter of Reprimands, DUI/DWI, Letters of indebtedness, missing 
NCOERs should be attached. ( If not, please explain below)  
Released from a fenced unit by COHORT/DIST  
Rangers must be released from CA DIV  [Ref 64]  
The Army realizes the important contribution enlisted contracting personnel have 
made and contingency contracting efforts of the Army and have designated 167 billets 
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throughout the Army to be permanently filled by NCOs with a permanent contracting 
MOS.  Once the MOS is permanent the Army intends to open the field to all promotable 
E-5s with a minimum of 6 years of service through E-8s in non-critically short MOSs.  
[Ref 63] 
E.  NAVY APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
Current Department of the Navy Policy only utilizes commissioned officers in the 
contracting field and therefore only commissioned officers perform the contingency 
contracting mission for the Navy.  The author found no indication that the Navy is 
considering the use of enlisted contingency contracting personnel.   
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented data collected from literature reviews and personal 
interviews conducted by the researcher.  The data revealed that each of the Military 
Services takes a different approach to the utilization of enlisted personnel performing 
contingency contracting.  The range is from heavy dependence by the Air Force and 
Marines, to growing dependenc e by the Army, to not utilizing them at all by Navy.  This 
data describes the entrance requirements, organizational structure, training, education, 
and employment of enlisted personnel within each of the Military Services.  This 
information is combined with the survey results in Chapter IV, which follows this 
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IV. 3044 SURVEY RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After looking at the environment of contingency contracting and exploring how 
each Military Service approaches the employment of enlisted contingency contracting 
personnel, this chapter now examines the results of a survey the researcher conducted of 
the 3044 community within the Marine Corps.  This survey was a web-based survey sent 
to the entire 3044 community.  The purpose was to evaluate the attitudes of enlisted 
3044s towards those aspects of their field that were within the scope of this study.  Those 
areas include the current struc ture, education, training, and employment of enlisted 
Marines within the 3044 community.  Using data from the survey, the researcher created 
all of the tables and figures used in this chapter.   
B. SURVEY PARTICIPATION 
The researcher utilized the “Survey Said” program to create the survey included 
in Appendix D.  This survey was then placed on an active web site hosted by one of the 
NPS servers.  The link to the survey web site was sent via e-mail attachment to all the 
senior enlisted 3044 Marines in the Marine Corps with instructions to take the survey and 
forward the link to all the 3044s under their supervision.  As Appendix A indicated, there 
are approximately 116 enlisted 3044s currently serving in the MOS.  Of that population, 
the researcher received 61 responses from members of the 3044 community.  That 
response equates to an approximate response rate of 53%.   
C. SURVEY RESULTS  
1. Demographics  
a. Question 1 Results 
Question 1 asked the respondents their current rank.  This question was 
designed to ensure that a representative sample was obtained from the population of 3044 
Marines.  Figure 9 shows the sample distribution by rank.  The vertical axis measures the 
number of respondents and the horizontal axis shows the respondent’s rank.  
b. Question 2 Results 
Question 2 asked respondents to select their command from those options 
given or select “other” as their response.  The researcher only included as a possible 
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option those major commands with more than one or two 3044s.  The results of question 
2 are shown in Figure 10.  The vertical axis show the command options respondents were 
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Figure 10.   Command Distribution. 
 
c. Question 3 Results 
Question 3 was designed to determine if Marines felt their rank was 
adequate for the performance of their duties.  Sixty of the respondents answered question 
3 and eleven of them or 18.03% responded that their rank was not adequate for the 
performance of their duties.  The remaining 81.96% (49) responded “yes” to the question.  
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d. Question 4 Results 
Question 4 asked the respondents who gave a “No” response to question 3 
to briefly explain why they felt their rank was not adequate.  All of the open -ended 
questions in this survey allowed the Marines to enter up to 30,000 characters in a window 
that followed the question.  Respondents could list as many reasons as the space would 
allow.  The results from question 4 are summarized below for the 11 respondents that 
answered “No”: 
· 45.45% (5) Responsibilities and job demands exceed that of peers in other 
MOSs 
· 36.36% (4) Current rank below that required by billet  
· 18.185 (2) Not taken seriously by seniors 
· 9.09% (1) No time for PME 
· 9.09% (1) NA 
e. Question 5 Results 
Since one of the prerequisites for entering the 3044 MOS is to have been 
at least a Sergeant with the 3043 (Supply) MOS, question 5 was asked to find out how 
many Marines are entering the MOS from the Supply field, the related fields of Logistics 
and Administration, or some other MOS.  The results of this question are shown in Figure 
11.  This graph lists the MOS choices on the vertical axis and the number of respondents 
along the horizontal axis. 
The graph shows that 60% of the Marines entering the 3044 field are from 
the Supply MOS with the remaining 40% being comprised of; 20% Other MOSs, 18.33% 
from the Administration field, and 1.67% from the Logistics field.  
f. Question 6 Results 
Question 6 asked the respondents to indicate how long they have been a 
member of the 3044 Community.  The responses to question 6 are shown in Figure 12.  
The number of respondents are shown on the vertical axis and the number of years in the 
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Figure 12.   Years in the 3044 MOS. 
 
g. Question 7 Results 
Question 7 asked the respondents to indicate their current DAWIA 
Certification Level.  The responses to question 7 are summarized below: 
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· 51.35% (19) Level I 
· 43.24% (16) Level II  
· 5.41% (2) Level III  
· 39.34% (24) Not certified 
h. Question 8 Results 
Question 8 asked the respondents to indic ate the DAWIA Certification 
Level their current billet requires.  The responses for question 8 are summarized below:  
· 40.74% (22) Level I 
· 55.56%  (30) Level II 
· 3.70% (2) Level III  
· 11.48% (7) did not know what level their billet required 
The researcher compared the individual responses to question 7 with the 
corresponding individual responses to question 8 to determine how many Marines did not 
hold the certification level their job required.  The researcher found that 50.8% (31) 
indicated that their current DAWIA certification level was below that required by their 
billet. 
i. Question 9 Results 
Question 9 asked the respondents to describe any difficulties they 
experienced when trying to attain their DAWIA Certification Level.  The results of 
question 9 are summarized below: 
· 37.70% (23) Difficulty getting a DAU seat  
· 14.75% (9) Difficulty getting time off from work to attend courses  
· 11.47% (7) Difficulties getting college work completed 
· 6.55% (4) Lack of funding to attend courses  
· 4.92% (3) Frequent deployments  
· 3.27% (2) Inaccurate information in Register Now  
· 1.64% (1) Missing college classes while TAD for DAU classes  
j. Question 10 Results 
Question 10 asked the respondents if they were currently assigned to a 
base or a contingency contracting billet.  The results to question 10 are summarized 
below: 
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· 84.75% (50) Base contracting billet 
· 15.25% (9) Contingency contracting billet 
· 3.28% (2) Did not answer the question. 
k. Question 11 Results 
Question 11 asked the respondents to indicate if they had completed a tour 
in a “B” Billet (an assignment outside an individual’s primary MOS) after receiving the 
3044 MOS.  Of the 61 respondents only 10% (6) of the Marines indicated they had 
completed a tour in a “B”.   
l. Question 12 Results 
Question 12 asked the Marines to indicate if they had completed a tour on 
the Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) degree completion Program after receiving 
the 3044 MOS.  Of the 61 respondents none of them indicated having participated in the 
program after receiving the 3044 MOS.  
m. Question 13 Results 
Question 13 asked those Marines that answered “yes” to question 11 or 12 
to list any difficulties they experienced upon returning to the 3044 MOS.  Of the six 
respondents that answered “yes” to question 11, 16.66% (1) indicated that he did not 
experience any difficulties upon returning to the MOS.  The remaining 83.33% (5) 
indicated that upon returning to the 3044 MOS they experienced problems with the 
changing regulations, the change from purchasing to contracting, changes to FAR part 
12, and the increased role of the Government Purchase Card.   
2. Training 
a. Question 14 Results 
Question 14 asked respondents to indicate how long they spent in an On -
The-Job (OJT) status.  Current Marine Corps policy is to have Marines spend six months 
in the (OJT) status.  The responses to question 14 are shown in Figure 13.  This graph 
shows months in the OJT period along the vertical axis and number of respondents along 
the horizontal axis.   
b. Question 15 Results 
Question 15 asked the respondents to list their first duty assignment upon 
completion of the OJT period.  The results from question 15 are summarized below: 
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· 67.21% (41) Base Contracting Office 
· 11.47% (7) Still in OJT status  
· 6.55% (4) Contingency Contracting office 
· 14.75% (9) Respondents did not answer the question 
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Figure 13.   OJT Time. 
 
c. Question 16 Results 
Question 16 asked respondents to indicate what DAU courses they were 
able to attend during the OJT period.  The results of question 16 are summarized below: 
· 36.06% (22) CON 101 
· 29.51% (18) NONE 
· 13.115% (8) CON 237 
· 8.19% (5) CON 104 
· 4.92% (3) CON 234 
· 3.72% (2) CON 100 
· 3.72% (2) CON 202 
· 4.92% (3) Respondents did not answer the question  
d. Question 17 Results 
Question 17 asked the respondents to indicate what difficulties they 
experienced trying to attend DAU courses - during the OJT period only.  The results of 
question 17 are summarized below. 
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· 37.70% (23) No problems experienced 
· 26.23% (16) DAU course seats were unavailable  
· 11.47% (7) Office policy did not allow them to attend DAU courses 
during OJT 
· 8.19% (5) On-line courses were difficult  
· 3.72% (2) Funding was not available for TAD corses  
· 1.64% (1) Did not understand the process to register for classes  
· 1.64% (1) Family commitments 
· 11.47% (7) Respondents did not answer the question 
e. Question 18 Results 
Question 18 asked the respondents to indicate what difficulties they 
experienced trying to attend DAU courses after their OJT period.  The results for 
question 18 are summarized below: 
· 27.87% (17) DAU course seats not available  
· 21.31% (13) No problems experienced 
· 8.19% (5) Not applicable 
· 8.19% (5) Getting time off from work to attend DAU courses  
· 6.55% (4) Deployments  
· 4.92% (3) Restrictions on DAU attendance 
· 4.92% (3) Personal commitments  
· 3.72% (2) Funding not available  
f. Question 19 Results 
Question 19 asked respondents to indicate if they were able to achieve the 
required 80 continuous learning points required during the last 2 year period ending 30 
September 2002.  Of the 61 responses received; 54.39% (31) responded “Yes”, 45.61% 
(26) Responded “No” and 6.56% (4) did not respond to the question. 
g. Question 20 Results 
Question 20 asked the respondents that answered “No” to question 19 to 
indicate the difficulties they experienced trying to achieve the 80 points required.  The 
responses for question 20 are summarized below (percentages based on 26 respondents): 
· 23.07% (6) Deployments 
· 15.38% (4) Did not understand requirements  
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· 15.38% (4) Less than 2 years in the MOS to date 
· 15.38% (4) Not certified (certified personnel only prior to 13 September 
2002) 
· 11.54% (3) Problems getting credits registered 
· 11.54% (3) Lack of opportunities  
· 7.70% (2) Time off work to attend training 
h. Question 21 Results 
Question 21 asked the respondents to indicate if their contracting 
office/unit/section had a designated training Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO).  40.68% 
(24) of the respondents indicated “Yes”, 59.32% (35) indicated “No”, and 3.28% (2) of 
the respondents did not answer the question.   
i. Question 22 Results 
Question 22 asked the respondents that replied “yes” to question 21 to 
indicate what kind of training is included in their annual training plan.  Respondents 
listed (35) topics that were covered in training plans, however, it was obvious that some 
offices had very good training plans while others were not comprehensive.  Additio nal 
comments ranged from “we cover everything” to “we are working on one” to “not a 
priority in this office” indicating annual training plans were not standardized across the 
Marine Corps.  In addition, none of the respondents indicated training being done  that 
was specifically geared towards contingency contracting.  
3. Education 
a. Question 23 Results 
Question 23 asked the respondents to indicate the highest degree of 
education they currently possess.  The results from question 23 are summarized below: 
· 56.67% (34) High School Diploma or equivalent 
· 25.00% (15) Associate Degree 
· 18.33% (11) Baccalaureate Degree 
· 0.00% (0) Masters Degree or higher  
· 1.64% (1) Did not respond to the question 
b. Question 24 Results 
Question 24 asked the respondents to indicate if they currently meet the 24 
semester credit hours of business related courses required under Section 824 of the 
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Defense Authorization Act of 2002.  Also, 53.33% (32) of the respondents indicated 
“Yes”, 46.67 (28) indicted “No” and 1.64% (1) did not respond to  the question.   
c. Question 25 Results 
Question 25 asked the respondents to indicate how many business -related 
college credit hours they possessed, prior to entering the MOS, if they do not currently 
meet the 24-semester hour minimum.  The results of Question 25 are shown in Figure 14 
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Figure 14.   Prior College. 
 
d. Question 26 Results 
Question 26 asked the respondents that answered “No” to question 24 to 
indicate how many business-related college semester credit hours they have been able to 
achieve after entering the 3044 MOS.  The responses to question 26 are included in 
Figure 15.  This graph shows semester hours along the horizontal axis and the number of 
respondents along the vertical axis.  
e. Question 27 Results 
Question 27 asked the respondents to indicate if they attend college 
courses during the workday.  The responses indicate that 15.52% (9) of the respondents 
do attend college courses during the workday, 84.48% (49) of the respondents do not 
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attend college during the workday, and 4.92% (3) of the respondents did not answer the 
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Figure 15.   Post MOS College. 
 
f. Question 28 Results  
Question 28 asked the respondents to describe problems they have 
encountered when trying to attend college courses after entering the MOS.  The responses 
to question 28 are summarized below: 
· 24.60% (15) Did not experience problems 
· 21.31% (13) Deployments 
· 14.75% (9) Availability of college courses  
· 8.19% (5) Long Work hours  
· 8.19% (5) Personal Issues  
· 6.55% (4) Lack of tuition assistance funds  
· 3.72% (2) Conflicts with DAU courses  
· 1.64% (1) Lost credits when transferring schools due to new duty 
assignments 
· 1.64% (1) Books too expensive 




g. Question 29 Results 
Question 29 asked the respondents to indicate how their educational 
opportunities could be improved.  The results of question 29 are summarized below: 
· 22.95% (14) Time off from work to attend classes  
· 11.47% (7) Improving the tuition assistanc e process 
· 8.19% (5) Make SNCO degree completion program  
· 6.55% (4) Improve college selections on base 
· 6.55% (4) Get college credit for DAU courses  
· 27.87% (17) Respondents did not answer the question 
4. Contingency Contracting Experience  
a. Question 30 Results 
Question 30 asked the respondents to indicate if they had the opportunity 
to serve in a contingency contracting billet.  Results to this question revealed that 44.07% 
(26) of the respondents indicated “Yes”, 55.93% (33) answered “No”, and 3.28%(2) of 
the respondents did not answer the question.   
b. Question 31 Results 
Question 31 asked those respondents that answered “No” to question 30 to 
briefly describe what prevented them from serving in a contingency contracting billet.  
The results of question 31 are shown below (percentages based on 29 of the 33 
respondents to question 30 that responded to this question – 4 failed to respond): 
· 37.93% (11) Billets not available  
· 31.03% (9) Still in OJT 
· 20.68% (6) Not certified 
· 10.34% (3) Told too junior 
· 3.45% (1) Chief billets normally do not deploy 
· 3.45% (1) No reason 
· 3.45% (1) Unknown 
c. Question 32 Results 
Question 32 asked those respondents that were not able to serve in a 
contingency contacting billet if they felt they were less competitive for promotion.  
Results revealed that 51.51% (17) of the respondents indicated “Yes” they felt less 
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competitive for promotion, 57.50% (23) indicated “No”, and 34.43% (21) did not answer 
the question.  Percentages for question 32 are based on the total sample size of 61 survey 
respondents since several of the Marines that responded “yes” to question 30 chose to 
answer this question anyway.  
d. Question 33 Results 
Question 33 asked the respondents to indicate how many tours they 
completed in contingency contracting billets (PCS assignments not temporary 
deployments).  Figure 16 shows the results of the question 33.  The graph shows the 
number of tours along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the 
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Figure 16.   Number of Contingency Contracting Tours.  
 
e. Question 34 Results 
Question 34 asked the respondents to indicate how many contingencies or 
training deployments the respondents participated in during their most recent contingency 
contracting tour only requiring them to perform their contingency contracting mission.  
Figure 17 contains the results of question 34.  This graph shows the number of 
contingencies along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the vertical 
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Figure 17.   Number of Deployments during Most Recent Contingency Tour.  
 
f. Question 35 Results 
Question 35 asked the respondents to indicate the number of contingency 
or exercise deployments they participated in during all prior Contingency Contracting 
tours that required them to perform their contingency contracting mission.  The results of 
question 35 are shown in Figure 18.  This graph shows the number of contingencies along 
the vertical axis and the number of respondents along the horizontal axis.   
g. Question 36 Responses 
Question 36 asked respondents to indicate if they were issued any waivers 
to be able to deploy in support of their contingency contracting mission.  Only two 
respondents answered the question.  Both indicated that they received a waiver for their 
certification level.  
h. Question 37 Results 
Question 37 asked the respondents to indicate if they had the opportunity 
to participate in operations or exercises where the respondent had the opportunity to work 
with enlisted contingency contracting personnel from other Services.  Results revealed 
that 44.07% (26) indicated “Yes” they had the opportunity to work with contingency 
contracting personnel from other services, 55.93% (33) indicated “No”, and 3.28% (2) 
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Figure 18.   All Previous Contingency Contracting Deployments.  
 
i. Question 38 Results 
Question 38 asked the respondents that responded “yes” to question 37 to 
indicate how they would rate the training other Services receive compared to the training 
the respondent received.  The results to this question revealed that 53.84%(14) of the 26 
respondents that answered “yes” indicated their counterpart’s training was “better”, 
7.69% (2) responded “Worse”, and 34.61%(9) indicated the training was the “Same”.  
j. Question 39 Results 
Question 39 asked the respondents that responded “yes” to question 37 to 
indicate how they would rate the education opportunities of other Services compared to 
those of the respondent.  Results indicate that 73.07% (19) of the 26 respondents that 
answered “yes” to question 37 indicated their counterpart’s education opportunities were 
“Better”, 3.85% (1) indicated it was “Worse”, and 19.23% (5) indicated it was the same.   
k. Question 40 Results 
Question 40 asked the respondents to indicate how they felt the Marine 
Corps could improve its contingency contracting Process.  The results of question 40 are 
summarized below: 
· 27.87% (17) Better contingency contracting training 
· 8.19% (5) Increase the number of Marines at the FSSGs  
· 6.55% (4) More deployments  
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· 6.55% (4) Better equipment for deployments  
· 6.55% (4) Combine the FSSG and Base Marines into one office 
· 4.92% (3) Increase the time between completing OJT and deploying 
(experience)  
· 4.92% (3) Establish Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for contingency 
contracting. 
· 3.72% (2) Educate commanders on involving 3044s in planning for 
deployments 
· 1.64% (1) More notice prior to deployments 
· 1.64% (1) More joint exercises  
· 50.82% (31) Respondents did not answer the question or put NA 
5. Future Intentions 
a. Question 41 Results 
Question 41 asked the respondents to indicate if they plan to get an 
Associates degree, Bachelors degree, or no degree while on active duty.  The results 
revealed that 9.09% (5) indicated they intended to get their Associates degree while on 
active duty, 83.64% (46) indicated they planned to get their Baccalaureate degree, 
7.27%(4) indicated they do not plan to get their degree while on active duty and 9.84% 
(6) did not respond to the question.   
b. Question 42 Results 
Question 42 asked the respondents to indicate what their plans were once 
they received their desired degree.  Figure 19 shows the results of this question.  This 
graph shows decision options along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents 
along the vertical axis.   
c. Question 43 Results 
Question 43 asked the respondents planning to exit active duty to in dicate 
what would be an attractive incentive to keep them on active duty.  The responses to this 
question are shown in Figure 20.  This graph lists the incentives along the vertical axis 
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Figure 19.   Stay or Go Once Desired Degree is Achieved. 
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Figure 20.   Incentives to Remain on Active Duty.  
 
d. Question 44 Results  
Question 44 asked the respondents to indicate what changes they would 
recommend to the 3044 MOS.  The results of question 44 are summarized below: 
· 42.625 (26) Create a Warrant Officer program more 3044s  
· 18.03% (11) Improve training 
· 14.75% (9) Make the 9656 commissioned officer MOS permanent  
· 14.75% (9) Higher retention bonuses  
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· 11.47% (7) Improve promotions  
· 9.83% (6) Allow 3044s to be commissioned officers af ter receiving their 
degree 
· 6.55% (4) Combine base and FSSG Marines  
· 3.725 (2) Standardize FSSGs  
· 3.72% (2) Establish military only DAU courses  
· 3.72% (2) Eliminate computer based DAU training courses – make 
classroom 
· 3.72% (2) Change structure 
· 3.72% (2) Improve incentives 
· 1.64% (1) Annual Chiefs Conference 
· 1.645 (1) Limit the number of OJTs allowed into MOS 
· 1.64% (1) Do not allow corporals to enter MOS  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The questions in the survey conducted by the researcher were designed to 
evaluate the attitudes of the current population of 3044s with respect to the structure, 
training, education, and employment characteristics of their MOS field as they view 
them.  In addition to their attitudes about these topics, the survey questions attempted to 
elicit their ideas on how these characteristics could be changed to improve their MOS.  
The data contained in this chapter will be analyzed in conjunction with the information 
contained in Chapters II and III to determine possibilities for improving the 3044 MOS.  



















This chapter analyzes the data presented in Chapters II through IV.  The analysis 
evaluates current Marine Corps policies and practices within the 3044 e nlisted 
community indicated by the survey results, literature reviews, and personal interviews.  
The analysis also compares these policies and practices of the Marine Corps to those of 
the other Services to determine where the Marine Corps might alter its practices to 
improve the quality of the enlisted contingency contracting Marines it deploys.  The 
analysis will look at the following broad areas: organizational structure, rank structure, 
education, training, and employment.  
B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
The current organizational structure of the 3044 community developed as a result 
of the Marine Corps philosophy that guides how Marines are organized for combat 
operations.  Essentially, Marines are assigned to either deploying comm ands or non-
deploying commands.  Figure 1 depicted the three basic deploying commands within the 
Marine Corps - Division, Wing, and FSSG.  All combat arms Marines (infantry, tanks, 
LAV, AAV, etc.) fall under the command of the division commander.  All avia tion 
related Marines (pilots, aviation mechanics, air traffic controllers, etc.) fall under the 
command of the Wing Commander.  Although there are support Marines assigned to the 
division and wing to facilitate logistical support, most support Marines (con tingency 
contracting, supply, fuel, construction, military police, etc.) fall under the command of 
the FSSG Commander.  Non-deploying commands are typically bases and air stations 
under the command of a base commander.  Marines assigned to these bases or s tations 
are normally not in a deploying status.  They are also typically support type Marines 
(base contracting, facilities, legal, etc.).   
The strength of this structure is that it gives the commanders uninterrupted 
positive control over their Marines.  Since the FSSG commander is tasked with providing 
all the support Marines required for a deployment, having all those Marines work directly 
for him ensures that he knows the capabilities of those Marines he is sending on 
deployments.  If any of the support  Marines sent on a deployment are less than fully 
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capable of performing their job, the FSSG commander will ultimately be responsible for 
that Marine’s performance.  As a result, having all those support Marines within his chain 
of command allows that FSSG commander to appoint subordinate commanders under 
him that will ensure deploying support Marines are fully capable of performing their 
mission.  The FSSG Marines are also given more combat skills training than their 
counterparts at base commands to ensure they are adequately prepared for the 
uncertainties of a combat environment.   
This organizational structure, however, creates a problem for the contingency 
contracting personnel when it comes to keeping their contracting skills sharp.  Unlike the 
skills required to employ an infantry weapon, which have changed very little over the 
past 50 years, contracting is a dynamic field that requires active participation on a daily 
basis to ensure new technology and changing regulations are understood and mastered.  
Having the contingency contracting Marines separated from the base contracting Marines 
creates a situation where the base contracting Marines are actively participating in 
contracting on a daily basis, but the contingency contracting Marines only participat e in 
contracting when they are deployed.  This means that contingency contracting Marines 
are underutilized when not deployed allowing their contracting skills to atrophy.  
Likewise, the base contracting Marines rarely deploy so, although they are current on the 
latest regulation changes and newest contracting technology, they are not getting 
experience with the nuances associated with deploying to a foreign country where 
contracting for support can be very different than contracting within the United States.   
In order to partially combat this situation the three FSSG commanders, to varying 
degrees as described in Chapter III, have decided to physically locate the FSSG 
contingency contracting personnel within the RCO collocated aboard the same base as 
the FSSG, but have opted not to give up full control of those Marines to the RCO 
director.  At various times personality disputes among the base and FSSG commanders 
have resulted in the FSSG Marines being pulled out of the RCOs and located within the 
FSSG headquarters.  This collocating was done so that FSSG Marines can get experience 
with performing base support contracts thereby keeping their skills up and reducing the 
workload on the base Marines.  This seems like a complete solution to the problem of 
keeping the contingency contracting Marines’ skills current, however since the RCO 
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director has little input into who deploys from the FSSG, the director is hesitant to assign 
work to the FSSG Marines that could improve their skills because they could potentially  
deploy (or be sent away for military skills training) leaving contracts in various stages of 
completeness that must be reassigned to another member of the contracting office.   
In addition, since only the FSSG Marines typically deploy, the base Marines 
could go three or four years without having conducted a deployment.  Their experience 
with those nuances of contingency contracting are then limited or outdated at best.  The 
survey results for question 40, “how can the Marine Corps improve its contingency 
contracting process”, tend to substantiate this concern among the 3044s as 6.55% of the 
respondents replied that more deployments were needed.  The Marines that gave this 
answer were currently assigned to a base command.  In addition, 8.19% of the 
respondents also indicated that more Marines needed to be sent to the FSSGs.  These 
responses indicate that the base 3044s realize the value of the deployments only the 
FSSG Marines get to perform and that a larger pool of deployable Marines is needed to 
reduce the frequency of deployments for the FSSG Marines that has escalated in response 
to the current operational tempo of the Marines Corps.  The survey results to question 35 
also indicate that Marines currently in contingency contracting billets are deploying on  a 
very frequent basis.  Ten of the respondents reported more than four deployments during 
their current tour, which is normally three years in length.  Two of the respondents to this 
question reported having done eight or more deployments during this curr ent tour.  The 
normal expectation during a three-year tour in a deploying billet is to do two or three 
deployments.   
 A secondary effect of the escalating deployments for the FSSG 3044s is their 
ability to obtain their DAWIA certification.  Survey results  indicate 4.92% of the 
respondents that replied to question 9, “describe any difficulties experienced when trying 
to attain DAWIA certification Level”, felt that frequent deployments were the reason that 
they were unable to get their certification.  In add ition, 23.07% of the respondents to 
question 20 “difficulties experienced trying to achieve 80 continuous learning points”, 
replied that they were unable to meet the 80-point minimum due to frequent deployments.    
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The Air Force and the Army do not make the distinction among contingency 
contracting and base contracting.  All of their personnel are considered to be in a 
contingency contacting billet.  As a result, they are able to evenly distribute deployments 
among all the members of their enlisted contracting force.  This reduces the frequency of 
deployments, which increases the time between deployments enabling their enlisted 
personnel more time to attend training and education classes.  Air Force personnel are 
given a wide range of base contracting responsibilities when not deployed because their 
deployment cycles are much more predictable.  When an individual is notified that he 
will be deploying the flight leader and team leader reassign the departing airman’s 
workload to other members of the team or flight.  This organizational structure by the Air 
Force and the Army allows them to maximize the hands-on work with contracts and 
deployed experience for their enlisted personnel while also giving them more stability to 
work on their certification levels.  The result is an enlisted contingency contracting force 
that has a more standardized level of experience and training.    
The Marine Corps enlisted contingency contracting force in comparison has a 
more diverse level of experience and training among its Marines.  Those Marines 
assigned to the FSSGs are more experienced with contingency contracting procedures, 
but less experienced with base support contracts while those Marines assigned to RCOs 
have more experience with base support contracts and less experience with contingencies.   
The Marine Corps could realize more standardization among its enlisted 3044s by 
adopting an organizational structure modeled after that of the Air Force and the Army.  
By combining the FSSG contingency contracting Marines with the base contracting 
Marines at the three RCOs within the Marine Corps the pool of available Marines to 
support deployments would essentially double.  Deployments could then be rotated 
among all the Marines within the RCO.  This would give individual Marines m ore time 
between deployments which would allow them increased opportunities to attend DAU 
courses, get their college training, and ultimately get their DAWIA certification sooner.   
C. RANK STRUCTURE 
The current rank structure has also become an issue with  members of the 3044 
community.  This was revealed in the responses to questions 3 and 4 of the survey.  
Question 3 asked the respondents to indicate whether they felt their current rank was 
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adequate.  Results show that 18% (11) of the respondents indicated that their rank was 
not adequate.  Question 4 then asked those respondents that indicated their rank was not 
adequate to comment on why they felt their rank was not adequate.  Results here show 
that 45.45% (5) of the respondents indicated their responsib ilities and job demands 
exceed that of peers in other MOSs.  In addition, 36.36% (4) of the respondents indicated 
their current rank was below that required by their billet and 18.18% (2) indicated that 
they were not taken seriously by senior officers they are required to brief when deployed.  
A response related to rank was also revealed in the responses to question 44.  The results 
of this question show that 14.75% (9) of the respondents to that question indicated the 
MOS could be improved by increasing promotion rates.  These responses indicate that 
almost 1/5 of the sample population feel that they should have a higher rank to perform 
their job and that promotions are too slow.    
The DAWIA requirement that enlisted personnel performing contracting within  
the military have a bachelors degree has created some potential retention problems for the 
Marine Corps contingency contracting force.  Once enlisted personnel receive a 
bachelor’s degree, they are potentially eligible to become commissioned officers.  
However, since a majority of these Marines will exceed the maximum age limit of 27 
years old to receive a commission by the time they complete their degree this option will 
not be available to them.  Many of the young 3044s the researcher spoke with during a 
recent visit to RCO Southwest realized that with a bachelor’s degree they could 
potentially get out of the Marine Corps and get a job that could compensate them at a 
higher rate than their enlisted salary.  The survey results for question 42 tend to 
substantiate this opinion.  Question 42 asked the respondents to indicate their future 
intentions after receiving the degree they were currently seeking.  Only 39.34% (24) of 
the respondents were certain they were going to remain on active duty after receiving 
their degree.  In fact, 22.95% (14) were convinced they were going to seek civilian 
employment after receiving their degree.  Also, 26.23% (16) of the respondents were 
undecided about their future intentions.  This could present a problem retaining senior 
enlisted Marines in the 3044 MOS.   
Question 43 asked the respondents to choose among five potential incentives that 
would be an attractive incentive to keep them on active duty.  Respondents chose all the 
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incentives except “more responsibility”.  The overwhelming choice, however, was to 
bring back the warrant officer program for contracting Marines.  Although the researcher 
was unable to locate any documentation with details about the warrant officer program 
for contracting, the researcher was told by several senior enlisted 3044s at the 2002 
Contracting Conference that there were warrant officers performing contracting in the 
Marine Corps when they came into the MOS years ago.  Responses show 37.70% (23) of 
the respondents to question 43 chose having a war rant officer program as the most 
attractive incentive to keeping them on active duty once they received their degree.  In 
addition, the responses to question 44, which asked respondents to describe how they felt 
their MOS could be improved, revealed an even higher percentage of the survey sample 
felt that a warrant officer program was necessary.  A full 42.62% (26) of the respondents 
made some mention of the need for a warrant officer program.  One respondent, in fact, 
mentioned in partial response to question 44 that the respondent had the privilege of 
working with CWO4 Maxam the last warrant officer in the contracting field.  Clearly the 
3044 population feels strongly that a warrant officer program would be beneficial to the 
MOS.   
In partial response to this rank structure issue, the 3044 Community Management 
Office at Headquarters Marine Corps is currently conducting a Grade Shape Review 
(GSR).  The purpose of this GSR is to structure the Marine Corps 3044 rank structure to 
more closely resemble the Air Force structure shown in Figure 6.  This pyramid structure 
prevents too many senior Marines from accumulating at the top of the rank structure and 
slowing down promotions for the junior Marines below them.  In discussions with 
headquarters personnel involved with this issue, the GSR is not considering incorporating 
warrant officers into the rank structure for 3044s.   
By including another layer of rank in the form of warrant officer billets the 
Marine Corps would be able to realize an increased promotion rat e and be able to 
upgrade many billets to a higher rank.  This would result in 3044s with the higher rank 
they feel is necessary to do their jobs, while providing an attractive incentive to retain on 





The new DAWIA requirement that enlisted Marines assigned to the contracting 
field possess a Bachelor’s degree and 24 semester hours of business related college 
courses has been difficult to achieve by all the branches of the military.  As outlined in 
Chapter II, this requirement was in response to the many commissions that have 
identified a lack of professional development within the military contracting community.  
Fortunately, this requirement, as contained in Section 808 of the National Defenses 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, was only in place one year before it was 
superseded by Section 824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002.  Section 824 eased this requirement somewhat by establishing a less stringent 
education requirement for members of the Armed Forces considered to be in the 
contingency contracting force.  The requirement for contingency contracting personnel is 
currently to complete at least 24 semester hours  of business related college coursework or 
to pass an examination that demonstrates the skills, knowledge, or abilities comparable to 
an individual who has completed at least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of 
study in any of the business discip lines it outlines.  As a result, the Air Force, Army, and 
Marine Corps consider all enlisted contracting personnel to be in the contingency 
contracting force.   
Discussions with headquarters personnel during the 2002 Marine Corps 
Contracting Conference revealed that the Services are attempting to develop a 
standardized equivalency examination that can be administered to their enlisted 
contracting personnel to meet the Section 824 option, outlined above, to pass an 
equivalency exam in lieu of meeting the 24 semester credit hour requirement.  Currently, 
the Services have been unable to develop one comprehensive exam or multiple individual 
exams that would cover the full 24-semester credit hour requirement.  The only avenue 
available under this option is for an individual to take an equivalency exam given by an 
accredited college or university that results in the individual being awarded college credit 
for a course the college gives that meets the requirements for “business” coursework 
outlined in Section 824.  These college level exams are usually difficult to pass and 
typically result in three or four semester credit hours being awarded.  It is very unlikely 
that an enlisted person with little or no previous college experience would be able to pass 
80 
eight separate college level exams in order to meet the 24-semester credit hour 
requirement.  This means the majority of the enlisted personnel must attend college 
classes to meet this requirement.   
The military environment poses some problems for enlisted personnel trying to 
take college courses to meet this requirement.  The first difficulty is that according to 
DAWIA once personnel are assigned to their contracting position they only have 18 
months to meet this requirement.  Since most colleges and universities hav e two 
semesters per year, or three quarters if operating on the quarter system, an enlisted person 
with no college credit upon entering the MOS would have to take at least three college 
classes (typically three or four semester credit classes) per quarter for the three quarter 
(18 month) period to meet the DAWIA education requirement.  Although this might be a 
heavy part-time college schedule, it is possible if the individual attends college without 
interruption for the entire 18 months.   
In addition to the restrictive time frame allowed to complete the 24 semester 
credit hours, several additional obstacles exacerbate the difficulty in accomplishing this 
requirement.  In an effort to discover what these obstacles were the survey given to the 
Marine 3044s asked several questions about education.  The first question on education, 
question 23, asked the respondents to identify the current level of education they possess.  
Of the respondents, 18.33% (11) indicated they had a baccalaureate degree and 25.00% 
(15) indicated they currently had an associate degree.  The remaining 56.67% (34) 
indicated they had a high school diploma.  The responses to question 23 are encouraging 
in that 42.62% (26) of the respondents have at least an Associate’s degree.   
However, the indications of trouble meeting the DAWIA education requirement 
for enlisted Marines can be found in the responses to question 24.  This question asked 
the respondents to indicate whether they meet the 24 semester credit hours required under 
DAWIA.  The responses indicate that almost half, 46.67% (28), do not meet this 
education requirement.  Subsequent survey questions 25 through 29 shed some light on 
why Marines are unable to meet this requirement.   
Since one of the goals of the Marine Corps is to select Marines for the 3044 MOS 
that already have some college credits under their wing, the researcher asked question 25 
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to determine how successful the Marine Corps has been at selecting Marines for the 3044 
MOS that already have some college.  The results of this question show that none of the 
Marines had 24 credits in business related college coursework prior to attaining the 3044 
MOS and only one Marine had more than 12 credits.  This indicates how difficult it is to 
bring enlisted Marines into the MOS that already meet the education requirement.  It is 
almost certain that Marines new to the MOS will be required to attend college in order to 
meet this requirement.   
The researcher then asked question 26 to determine how successful Marines have 
been at taking college courses after receiving the MOS.  Only one respondent indicated 
having been able to take the full 24 semester credit hours of college work after attaining 
the MOS.  This highlights how difficult it is for these Marines to attend college classes 
after they are in the MOS.  As a result, not only is it difficult for the Marine Corps to 
select Marines for the 3044 MOS that already have college work completed, it is just as 
difficult to get Marines through college courses once they are in the MOS.   
Question 27 then asked the respondents if attending college during the workday 
was made available to them.  The results indicate that 84.48% (49) of the respondents do 
not attend college during the workday.  This means that Marines are expected to work a 
full day at work and then take college classes at night.  Since a standard three -credit 
college course means three hours of class time per week per course, a Marine with little 
or no college prior to entering the MOS might have to attend college every weeknight.   
This requires a lot of determination on the individual’s part to maintain this rigorous 
schedule for 18 months.  If Marines were allowed to attend college classes during the 
day, they could potentially complete their college requirements in a much shorte r period 
of time.   
In an effort to determine the most common problems encountered by Marines 
trying to attend college courses, the researcher asked question 28.  This question gave the 
respondents an opportunity to identify the difficulties they experienc ed.  The most 
common problem cited was frequent deployments, which 21.31% (13) of the respondents 
listed.  The next most frequently cited problem was the lack of college courses available, 
which 14.75% (9) of the respondents gave as a problem they encounte red.  Other 
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comments ranged from long work hours to lost credits when transferring to a new duty 
station.  Two additional problems cited were conflicts with DAU courses and expensive 
books.   
The Air Force has been able to address some of these difficultie s for its enlisted 
personnel through its Community College of the Air Force (CCAF).  This college 
administered by the Air Force offers many of the business college courses listed by 
DAWIA as satisfying the educational requirements.  Since the campus is dis bursed across 
the Air Force bases, students that transfer from one base to another do not lose their 
credits.  Since the Air Forces teaches its enlisted personnel DAU equivalent courses as an 
MOS school through its CDC courses, there is less conflict with having to send personnel 
TAD to DAU courses potentially disrupting college courses.  The Air Force also has a 
separate education program that covers the cost of expensive books for enlisted Air Force 
personnel.   
Survey Question 39 asked the Marine respond ents that served with enlisted 
contracting personnel from other Services to rate the other Service’s education 
opportunities as compared to their own.  An overwhelming 73.07% (19) indicated that 
the opportunities provided by the other Services were better.  The results of this survey 
question indicate that the Marine Corps could benefit from the use of the Air Force CDC 
courses, developing an improved tuition assistance program that covers the cost of books, 
improving the selection and standardization of college courses offered aboard Marine 
Corps bases, and allowing Marines to attend school during part of the workday.  These 
changes could go a long way toward improving the number of Marines that meet the 
education requirement as outlined under DAWIA and reversing the feeling among 
Marines that other Services have better education opportunities than the Marine Corps.     
E.  TRAINING 
Once accepted for a transfer into the 3044 MOS, the first training requirement that 
enlisted personnel must complete is a six -month OJT period.  Marines are normally sent 
to a Regional Contracting Office to complete this OJT.  As mentioned in Chapter III, this 
is a very loosely structured program within the Marine Corps.  There is no formal 
structure associated with what is covered during this OJT period.  Survey question 14 
indicates that there is no standardized time frame for completing the OJT period.  When 
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the respondents were asked how long they spent in an OJT status, the results ranged from 
one month to more than 10 months.  Although 65.57% (40) of the respondents indicated 
they spent six months in an OJT status, 13.11% (8) of the respondents replied that that 
they spent more than 10 months in an OJT status.  Currently there is no guide or format 
to follow when conducting this OJT training.  Without a standardized OJT training plan it 
cannot be certain that all Marines leave the OJT period with the same set of skills.  For 
example, what one Marine is being taught at RCO Southwest may be completely 
different from what a Marine is being taught at RCO Okinawa - and is completely 
dependent upon the individual assigned to conduct the OJT.   
In contrast, the Air Force has developed a comprehensive checklist described in 
Chapter III that must be signed, not only by the individual bein g trained and the person 
conducting the training, but also by a certifier trained to certify that the training received 
meets the minimum level expected of all Air Force OJTs.  The Air Force can be certain 
that each of its enlisted personnel have the same set of skills upon completion of the OJT 
period.  This checklist is continued throughout the Air Force personnel’s contracting 
career.  The Marine Corps could standardize the training received by all 3044s during 
their OJT period by developing a standardiz ed and documented program that ensures 
those contracting skills determined to be the most valuable for new entrants are taught to 
all 3044s during their OJT period.   
The researcher also discovered, after looking at the results of survey questions 7 
and 8, that 50.80% (31) of the respondents did not currently meet the DAWIA 
certification level required by their billet.  The survey then asked those respondents that 
did not meet the DAWIA certification level for their billet to indicate the difficulties they 
experienced when trying to attain their certification level.  Question 9 revealed that 
37.70% (23) of the respondents indicated that the most common problem preventing 
them from attaining their DAWIA certification was difficulty getting into DAU courses.  
After attending the 2002 Marine Corps Contracting Conference, the researcher found that 
a major contributor to the difficulties Marines experience when trying to take DAU 
courses has to do with the way DAU apportions its course seats.  DAU essentially 
allocates a certain number of seats to the Army, Air Force, and Navy.   
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The Marine Corps does not get its own allocation of course seats to manage.  
Marines must apply for and get a seat under the Navy’s allocation.  The most frequent 
problem with this system is that once a Marine submits a request for one of the Navy 
seats there is no way of knowing if it has been taken by an acquisition member of the 
Navy until DAU notification is sent via e-mail one or two weeks prior to the start of the 
course.  If a Marine receives notification that the course was full, that Marine must go 
through the registration process again for the next available course.  Marines at the 
contracting conference were very frustrated with this system, some indicating that they 
had been dropped several times from the same DAU course they were attempting to take.   
The Marine Corps has made some progress at getting this situation corrected.  
This year the Marine Corps was granted approval by DAU to have three CON 234 
Contingency Contracting courses taught aboard Marine Corps installations exclusively 
for Marines.  DAU instructors will conduct two courses at Camp Lejeune and one course 
at Camp Pendleton during Fiscal Year 2003.  This was requested by the Marine Corps to 
alleviate some of the bac klog of Marines that need to attend this course.  This will 
temporarily ease the backlog, but a more permanent solution needs to be found to ensure 
Marine 3044s get the training they require.  If the Marine Corps had its own allocation of 
DAU seats, separate from the Navy, that Headquarters Marines Corps could monitor, 
Marines would have a better chance of getting into the DAU courses they needed.   
The researcher also wanted to know what kind of internal contracting training was 
available to Marines other than DAU courses and OJT.  Question 21 asked the 
respondents if their office/unit/section had a training Non-commissioned Officer (NCO).  
Most Marine units appoint one individual within an organic unit to plan, coordinate, and 
document the training that is  being accomplished within that unit.  Responses to question 
21 indicate that 59.32% (35) of the Marines surveyed did not have a training NCO 
appointed within their office/unit/section.  Part of the responsibilities of the training NCO 
is to be knowledgeable about the training standards for the MOSs within the unit and 
ensure that established training objectives are accomplished.  The lack of a training NCO 
at so many of the Marine units further indicates that training may not be conducted as 
efficiently and effectively throughout the Marine Corps as it could be if each unit had an 
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individual tasked with ensuring that Marines within that unit were getting the training 
they required.   
The researcher also wanted to know what kind of training was being conduct ed at 
those units that did have a training NCO.  Question 22 asked respondents to indicate what 
kind of training was included in their annual training plan.  Although the responses listed 
25 distinct topics that were covered in training plans, 17 of them c ame from just three of 
the respondents.  This indicates that some units are doing very good job of training over a 
wide variety of contracting topics while some units are not doing as good a job of training 
their personnel on relevant contracting issues.    
The Air Force AFSC 6C0X1 Contracting Career Field Education and Training 
Plan (CFETP) represents a standard training plan that all Air Force personnel are 
expected to follow.  The CFETP not only describes the type of training and how it is to 
be conducted, it also indicates minimum time periods that should be devoted to each 
topic and requires that the training be certified by a trained certifier.  This process ensures 
that when Air Force enlisted personnel are given a certain skill level that the Air Force 
can positively identify the skills those individuals have mastered.   
If a similar system were to be adopted by the Marine Corps, Marines would have 
a more uniform level of training among its enlisted personnel.  In addition, supervisors 
would be able to tell from the documentation what training newly arriving individuals 
required and could focus on that training first.  When the time comes for a deployment, 
supervisors would also be able to make better personnel assignments to ensure that 
Marines sent out alone were capable of performing their mission.  A well -documented 
training record could also be used to improve performance ratings of individual Marines 
and assist with the selection process for promotions.  
The researcher also made a surprising discov ery among the responses to question 
22.  Not one of the respondents indicated that any kind of contingency contracting 
specific training was being conducted within any of the contracting offices within the 
Marine Corps.  All of the topics listed were important topics and necessary for the 
conduct of contingency contracting, but the researcher was surprised that no mention was 
made of training that would assist Marines when deploying to a foreign country to 
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conduct contracting actions.  Since the primary mis sion of enlisted personnel and 
commissioned officers in the Marine Corps contingency force is to provide contracting 
support to deployed Marine units, it would seem that periodic contingency training, in 
addition to that received in CON 234, would be a valuable asset to these Marines.   
The Air Force contingency contracting training program described in Chapter III, 
that is conducted one day per month, appears to be a valuable tool to keep contracting 
personnel engaged in thinking about the nuances of conducting contracting actions 
outside the continental United States.  The level of importance placed on conducting 
contingency contracting training in the Air Force is reflected in the Top Dollar 
competition that has developed to showcase those skills.   
Marine contingency contracting personnel do conduct much of the training that is 
included in the Air Force contingency contracting training program, such as NBC 
training, weapons training, and physical fitness training.  However, the researcher could 
not find indications that the Marine contingency contracting force had a method in place 
to conduct scenario-based contingency contracting training.  Both the Air Force and the 
Marine Corps are adept at capturing after-action reports from the contracting personnel 
that are sent on deployments.  The Air Force utilizes this information contained in those 
after-action reports to create scenario based training modules for its personnel.  These 
training modules are used to place contracting personnel in fictitious situations that 
require them to devise a solution to a problem in a set amount of time.  This creates an 
active means of passing on the information learned from previous deployments vice the 
passive means of just collecting this information in files and expecting  contingency 
contracting personnel to sift through it prior to deploying in an effort to locate any 
valuable information it might contain.   
The Marine Corps could not only replicate this model used by the Air Force, it 
could also easily get access to scenarios already created by the Air Force and use them as 
training tools for Marine contingency contracting personnel.  Air Force training personnel 
the researcher spoke with were excited about the prospect of both sharing their 
information with and learning from the Marine Corps.   
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The standardized and well-documented OJT and career training, DAU equivalent 
courses, specifically allocated DAU seats, certified trainers, and scenario based training 
could be part of the reason that 53.84% (14) of the respondents  to question 38 indicated 
that training received by other Services was “better” than that received by Marine Corps 
contingency contracting personnel.  By adopting some of these practices the Marine 
Corps might realize both improved training among its personnel and better support to 
deployed Marine forces.   
F. EMPLOYMENT 
As described in Chapter III, the Marine Corps deploys the majority of its 
contingency contracting personnel from the three FSSGs within the Marine Corps.  Also 
as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter this gives the FSSG commander positive 
control and flexibility regarding who gets deployed to support an exercise.  The 
researcher wanted to know what affect this had on the enlisted contingency contracting 
force.  Survey question 30 asked the respondents if they had been given the opportunity 
to serve in a contingency contracting billet.  The responses to this question indicated that 
44.07% (26) had been able to serve in a contingency contracting billet while 55.93% (33) 
responded that they had not had an opportunity.   
Question 31 then asked the respondents that indicated “no” they had not had an 
opportunity to serve in a contingency contracting billet to briefly describe why.  The most 
common response at 37.93% (11) indicated that a lack of a sufficient number of 
contingency contracting billets prevented them from serving in a contingency contracting 
billet.  Another 31.03% (9) replied that they were still in their OJT period, and the next 
highest response was due to a lack of certificatio n given by 20.68% (6) of the 
respondents.  This indicates that the policy of only deploying Marines from the FSSG 
billets leaves some Marines that would deploy if they had the chance, unable to do so.   
Question 32 then asked the respondents that did not have an opportunity to deploy 
if they felt they were less competitive for promotion.  This question was designed so that 
only those Marines that responded “no” to question 30 would reply, however, all of the 
respondents chose to answer the question.  The results still capture the researcher’s intent, 
which was to find out if the 3044s perceived not serving in a contingency contracting 
billet as making them less competitive for promotion.  The results indicate that 57.50% 
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(23) of the respondents felt they wer e not as competitive for promotion if they did not 
serve in a contingency contracting billet as their counterparts who did.   
The researcher then asked question 34 to discover how equitably deployments are 
distributed among Marines in their most recent contingency contracting billets.  The wide 
variations among the responses to this question indicate that deployments are not equally 
distributed.  Some of the respondents indicated having done no deployments while two of 
the respondents indicated they did more than eight deployments during their most recent 
deployment.  Some of the variation observed could be the result of the time period in 
which the respondents served in the contingency contacting billet.  Certain periods in the 
recent past involved more Mar ine deployments than others.  However, the implication 
remains that deployments may not be equitably distributed among the contingency 
contracting billets within the FSSGs.   
One final thought on the employment of 3044s has to do with the level of 
experience deploying Marines have when they deploy.  Although Marines are typically 
sent to a base contracting billet for at least 2 years after completing OJT prior to being 
assigned to a contingency contracting billet, four of the respondents to survey question 15 
indicated that they were assigned to a contingency contracting billet following 
completion of the OJT period.  The less formalized system of making assignments within 
the Marine Corps results in Marines being sent on missions with varying levels of 
experience.   
In contrast, the Air Force use of skill levels to categorize personnel according to 
their experience level and the practice of deploying lower skill levels with senior skill 
levels through the use of Unit Type Codes (UTC) listed in Appendix C ens ures a more 
standardized level of experience among deployed contracting personnel.  The Air Force 
also utilizes a computerized listed of personnel to more equitably spread the deployments 
out among its contracting personnel.  
To summarize the issues regarding the employment of enlisted contingency 
contracting personnel presented in this section, Marines equate deployments with 
increased potential for promotion.  Also, the limited number of FSSG billets means that 
more Marines want to deploy than are able to deploy and those Marines that are in FSSG 
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billets are not as equitably deployed as they could be if the Marine Corps combined the 
FSSG and RCO billets and then implemented a Marine Corps wide system to track the 
number of deployments each Marine conducts.  Deployments could then be more 
equitably assigned to the contingency contracting population.   
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the information contained in Chapters II through IV to 
evaluate the perception of the current Marine Corps contingency contracting force in 
relation to contingency contracting practices utilized by other branches of the military.  
The analysis in this chapter forms the basis for the conclusions and recommendations 
















































VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has presented a thorough overview of the issues facing the 3044 
enlisted contingency contracting community.  It began by developing an  historical 
perspective of contingency contracting and then presented some current reasons why the 
use of contingency contracting is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.  The focus 
then became the evolution of DoD regulations that govern the con tingency contracting 
force.  Chapter III then explored the different approaches taken by the Marine Corps, Air 
Force, Army, and Navy in the utilization of enlisted personnel to perform their 
contingency contracting mission.  Chapter IV presented the result s of a survey the 
researcher conducted of the 3044 community.  The data collected in Chapters II through 
IV were then analyzed in Chapter V.  The analysis produced the conclusions and 
recommendations contained in this chapter.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  Through DAWIA, Congress is taking steps to change the “unprofessional” 
image of the Acquisition Workforce by imposing Training and Education 
requirements upon all the members of the Acquisition Community  
This study has shown that contingency contracting is a dynamic process that has 
been a vital part of United States military operations since the American Revolution.  
Given the current environment of military operations, described in Chapter II, the 
utilization of contingency contracting will not only continue, but  will likely escalate as 
the DoD attempts to become more efficient at providing logistical support to its deployed 
operating forces.  As the use of contingency contracting increases, so does the cost of 
providing this type of support, which increasingly draws the attention of oversight 
organizations within the Federal Government.  The result of this oversight has been 
increased legislation designed to ensure that DoD personnel performing duties in the 
realm of contracting are educated and trained to be a responsible and professional 
workforce capable of making sound financial decisions when given fiduciary 
responsibility for American taxpayer dollars.   
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2.  The Military Services are finding it difficult to meet these new training 
and educational requirements, established by DAWIA, for their enlisted personnel 
The DAWIA legislation has become more demanding in recent years by 
establishing college education requirements, in addition to the extensive DAWIA training 
requirements, that must be met by enlisted personnel serving in contracting positions.  
Unlike commissioned officers that are required to have a bachelor’s degree, enlisted 
personnel are not expected to have college level training.  As a result, many enlisted 
personnel that enter the contracting force either have no college experience, or have only 
taken a few classes.  The result is that enlisted personnel are expected to attend college 
courses while being capable of deploying to support contingency operations.  Doing both 
is proving to be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish within the 18-month time 
period established by DAWIA to meet the training and education requirements for a 
given DAWIA certification level.     
3.  The Marine Corps and the Air Force are more dependent upon enlisted 
personne l to perform their contingency contracting mission than the Navy and the 
Army 
Each of the Military Services has developed a unique response to this difficult 
situation.  The Navy has decided for the present not to employ enlisted contingency 
contracting personnel.  The Army, realizing the important contribution enlisted 
contingency contracting personnel can make, is in the process of developing a permanent 
contracting MOS for its enlisted personnel.  The Marine Corps and the Air Force are 
heavily dependent upon enlisted contingency contracting personnel.  A comparison of the 
ratio of officer to enlisted contingency contracting personnel reveals that the Marine 
Corps has a ratio of approximately 1:6 while the Air Force has a ratio of 1:5.  If the way 
the Marines are structured is taken into consideration, the FSSGs - which contain the 
contingency contracting billets - have a ratio of 1:8.     
4.  The Marine Corps could emulate some of the practices of the Air Force to 
improve the career development of 3044s  
Although the relative size difference would make it difficult for the Marine Corps 
to fully adopt the system used by the Air Force, the Marine Corps could develop similar 
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practices that would improve the effectiveness of its contingency contracting force.  T his 
study specifically evaluated the Military Services in regard to their structure, training, 
education, and deployment of enlisted personnel to determine the impact each was having 
on personnel development among the Services.  The analysis shows that per sonnel 
development within the Marine Corps contingency contracting force can be improved by 
implementing some of the recommendations found in Section C of this chapter.  
5.  The current structure of the Marine Corps contracting force impedes the 
efforts of enlisted personnel to meet their DAWIA requirements  
The current structural approach taken by the Marine Corps of segregating its 
contingency contracting personnel into a separate command from its base contracting 
personnel makes it more difficult for enlis ted 3044s to meet their DAWIA requirements.  
Limiting the number of deployable 3044s to just those in the FSSG billets means those 
Marines are called upon to do multiple deployments.  While these Marines are deployed 
they are unable to attend college or DAU courses required to meet their DAWIA 
requirements.   
6.  Training and education opportunities afforded 3044s could be improved 
by implementing programs similar to those of other Services  
The Air Force has a comprehensive training program that specificall y targets the 
unique challenges of contingency contracting.  The Air Force also has well -established 
training goals and tracking devices to ensure that all its enlisted personnel have a 
standardized level of competency upon completion of OJT and throughout  their career.  
In addition, the Air Force covers the entire cost of college courses for its enlisted 
personnel.  Currently, the Marine Corps does not match the Air Force in these areas.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Marine Corps Should Alter the 3044 Organizational Structural  
The Marine Corps should combine the enlisted contingency contracting personnel 
at each of the three FSSGs with their counterparts at the three collocated RCOs.  Under 
the administrative control of the RCO director, this larger pool of enlisted contingency 
contracting personnel would provide a more diverse base from which to support both 
base contracting operations and contingency operations.  The RCO director would be 
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tasked with providing contracting personnel to support contingencies in the region 
previously covered by the FSSG contingency contracting personnel.  These Marines 
could them be detached from the RCO and attached to the FSSG, or Joint unit requesting 
contingency contracting support, and returned to the RCO upon completion o f the 
contingency or exercise.  This would allow the RCO director to ensure a more 
standardized level of training and deployed experience among the 3044s within that 
RCO.  All 3044s assigned to that RCO would have the opportunity to deploy and FSSG 
personnel would be able to get more hands on experience with contracting actions in the 
garrison environment.  This would also make it easier to synchronize deployments, DAU 
training courses and college classes to improve the ability of individuals to accomplish all 
three of these to the maximum extent possible.   
2. The Marine Corps Should Consider Reviving the Contracting 
Warrant Officer Program 
With this larger pool of contingency contracting personnel at each of the three 
RCOs, the Marine Corps should consider  creating warrant officer billets at each RCO to 
improve the training and readiness of the contingency contracting force.  This would 
provide a positive retention incentive to keep some of the brightest and most aggressive 
enlisted personnel from leaving the Marine Corps to pursue a career in the civilian 
market.  This could also help create the more professional workforce that is the 
underlying goal of the DAWIA legislation.   
3. Improvements Should be Made to the Education Opportunities 
Available to Enlisted 3044s 
Meeting the 24 semester credit hours of college level business coursework has 
proven to be a challenge for the Marine Corps, as well as the other Military Services.  
Since time to attend college courses and the availability of classes were the le ading 
reasons Marines surveyed gave for not being able to meet this 24 hour minimum, the 
Marine Corps should consider allowing Marines to attend college courses during the 
normal workday.  OJT could be conducted during half of the day and college courses 
conducted during the other half of the day.  This would increase the possibility of enlisted 
personnel meeting this requirement within the timeframe established by DAWIA.   
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The Marine Corps should also consider adopting a program similar to that used by 
the Air Force that pays for all the expenses associated with college courses to include 
books and fees.  Currently the Marine Corps policy of only covering the tuition costs 
creates the potential for enlisted Marines to delay enrolling in college courses or attend 
courses without all the necessary materials, if the cost of books is perceived to be 
exorbitant.   
4. Improve the Training Available to the 3044 Community  
The researcher discovered during the survey and the researcher’s attendance at the 
2002 Marine Corps Contracting Conference that Marines needed better training.  The 
dependence on the Navy for DAU seats, the frequent lack of funding to attend DAU 
courses and the limited number of DAU course offerings has been a major source of 
irritation for the Marine Corps contracting force.  The Marine Corps should pursue 
getting its own quota of DAU course seats that could be managed at the Community 
Management Office at Headquarters Marine Corps.  This would ensure that the Marine 
Corps has the opportunity to get its personnel the training needed to meet the DAWIA 
certification standards.  The Marine Corps should also explore the possibility of sending 
Marines to DAU equivalent courses such as the CDC courses taught by the Air Force.  
5. Develop a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Contingency 
Contracting Training 
Developing a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for contingency contracting 
training would provide a standardized level of expectations among Marine contingency 
contracting personnel.  This SOP should address the issues that should be covered during 
the OJT period and provide a means of documenting and tracking a 3044’s progress 
towards meeting those standards.  This should not only be limited to the OJT period, but 
should span the Marine’s career outlining all the training milestones that must be met 




6. Establish a Training Office Within the Marine Corps Headquarters to 
Develop Contingency Contracting Training .    
The scenario-based training being conducted by the Air Force is a useful tool to 
help develop the mental awareness of enlisted contingency contracting personnel.  The 
Marine Corps should designate a position within the Marine Corps Headquarters to 
collect after-action reports from contingency operations.  This information could then be 
used to generate training modules that could be sent to all the Marine Corps contracting 
offices as training aids to improve contingency contracting situational awareness 
throughout the force.  This could also be done in conjunction with Air Force personnel to 
create a Joint program.  
7. The Marine Corps Should Evaluate the Potential Benefits of 
Developing an Employment System for Deploying 3044s  
The Air Force currently uses a system of deploying its contracting per sonnel that 
utilizes a skill level indicator.  Although a system such as this would likely prove to be 
too cumbersome for the smaller population of Marine Corps contingency contracting 
personnel, it does provide a model that should be studied by the Marine  Corps to evaluate 
how well Marines are deployed in accordance with their capabilities.  If the Marine Corps 
could adopt some of the principles of this system, it might prove to be useful in ensuring 
Marines that are sent on deployments are fully prepared for the situations they are likely 
to be confronted with when outside the continental United States.  
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objectives of this study were guided by one primary research question and 
five secondary research questions.  After collecting data, analyzing those data, and 
drawing conclusions from the analysis, responses to these research questions can now be 
provided. 
1. Answer to Primary Research Question    
What effect has the changing contingency contracting environment had on 
personnel career development within the United States Marine Corps contingency 
contracting force and how might career development policies and processes be 
improved?   
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The background information contained in Chapter II revealed that the contingency 
contracting environment is a dynamic one that has been around since the Revolutionary 
War and appears to be growing in importance to the U.S. Military Forces due to the many 
environmental factors described in Chapter II.  The impact this environment has had on 
personnel career development within the Marine Corps was evaluated through literature 
reviews and personal interviews contained in Chapter III and the survey results presented 
in Chapter IV.  Recommendations for improving career development policies and 
procedures within the Marine Corps are presented in the recommendations contained in 
Section C of this chapter.   
2. Answers to Secondary Research Questions  
How is career development currently being addressed within the United 
States Marine Corps contingency contracting community?   
Chapters III and IV presented the details surrounding the current career 
development approach being taken by the Marine Corps.  The analysis of this information 
was presented in Chapter V and revealed that the flexible Marine Corps approach to 
organizational structure supports unity of command, but creates inefficiencies in training, 
educating, and employing enlisted contingency contracting personnel.  The researcher 
focused on the three FSSG units within the Marine Corps.  The Marine Co rps is currently 
addressing these issues through a grade shape review, currently being conducted at 
Headquarters Marine Corps and a comprehensive Campaign Plan that establishes goals to 
improve efficiency in some of these areas.  Recommendations are made in this chapter 
that could assist in these efforts.   
What can be learned from effective career development practices within 
other Military Services? 
Chapter III described the current contingency contracting practices within the 
Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Navy.  The information presented focused on the 
structure, education, training, and employment of enlisted contracting personnel.  Since 
the Navy does not utilize enlisted personnel for contingency contracting and the Army is 
restructuring its enlis ted contracting force, most of the useful information gathered from 
this chapter came from the Air Force.  The Air Force has developed several tools and 
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procedures that could benefit the Marine Corps contracting force.  These lessons learned 
are captured in the recommendations made in Section C of this chapter.  
What training and education issues are affecting enlisted contingency 
contracting personnel and their career opportunities?   
Chapter IV of this thesis presented responses to several research questio ns that 
were designed to answer this question.  The results indicate that enlisted personnel in 
3044 MOS, like all the Military Services, are having difficulty meeting the DAWIA 
education requirement for all members of the contingency contracting force to have 24 
semester credit hours in business related courses.  Frequent deployments, availability of 
college classes, tuition assistance, and long work hours were the primary issues affecting 
3044s efforts to meet this education requirement.  Training requirements under DAWIA 
were also listed as difficult to meet with availability of DAU courses toping the list of 
issues preventing enlisted personnel from meeting their training requirements under 
DAWIA.  Training and education difficulties were both listed as reasons for enlisted 
personnel not being certified under the DAWIA standards.   
Should the personnel structure of the Marine Corps contracting offices be 
changed to accommodate improved career development opportunities? 
After comparing the Marine Corps approach to structuring its contingency 
contracting offices with that of the Air Force and the Army, it appears that combining all 
enlisted personnel within a geographical area into one pool of contingency contracting 
personnel under one command structure creates an environment that has the potential for 
improved training, education, employment, and promotion opportunities for enlisted 
contingency contracting personnel.  Therefore, one of the recommendations contained in 
Section C of this chapter recommends that the Marine Corps combine the contracting 
personnel from the FSSG offices with the personnel from the RCO offices into one pool 
of contingency contracting personnel under the direction of the RCO director at each of 
the three major RCOs.  It is also recommended that the Marine Corps evaluate the 
potential to revive the warrant officer program it once had for the contracting community 
to create retention incentives for enlisted personnel.  
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What changes are necessary to improve personnel career development within 
the Marine Corps contingency contracting force? 
This question is answered in the recommendations contained in Section C of this 
chapter.  Adopting these recommendations could improve the career development of 
enlisted contingency contracting personnel while improving the level of support these 
Marines are able to provide to deployed units.    
E.  RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
After conducting this research the author discovered additional areas of research 
within this same area of study that were outside the scope of this thesis.  The following 
topics could provide useful information for the contingency contracting community.   
1.  Regionalization has become a buzzword at Headquarters Marine Corps of late.  
New digital contracting tools, the use of contract bundling, and personnel shortages are 
changing the landscape of Marine Corps contracting offices.  An analysis could be 
conducted that would evaluate the number of Marine Corps contracting offices, their 
volume of contracts, and personnel support issues to determine the most cost-effective 
means of organizing Marine Corps contracting personnel that is efficient yet meets the 
needs of Marine Corps customers.   
2.  Perform a cost/benefit analysis of providing contingency contracting support 
with Government civilian personnel vice military personnel.  The growing use of 
Government civilian employees to perform the contingency contracting missions might 
have an effect on the future personnel needs of contingency contracting offices within the 
Marine Corps and other branches of the U.S. Military.   
3.  There are currently units within the Marine Corps that outsource their 
contacting needs.  A study of these units could be conducted to determine how well these 
outside agencies provide the logistical support required by the military units they serve.  
In essence, is it more cost effective for the Marine Corps to outsource contracting than to 
retain this function as a military core competency?   
4.  Develop a standardized career development plan for Marin e Corps enlisted 
contracting personnel.  This plan should include clearly stated goals and objectives that 
are relevant and measurable.  A method of documentation should be included that permits 
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both contracting personnel and their supervisors to track ind ividual progress toward 
career goals.  This would go a long way to standardize the level of training common to all 

































APPENDIX B. ENLISTED 3044 BILLETS 
Command 




MCC 008 HQ-LB         
MGYSGT 5103 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  0054 M 1 
GYSGT 5103 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 0055A M 0 
SSGT 5103 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 0055B M 2 
GYSGT 5103 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 5683 R 1 
GYSGT 5114 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 0244 M 1 
    Total 4 
      
MCC 012 QUANTICO       
MSGT 7411 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  1491 M 1 
GYSGT 7411 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1499 M 1 
SSGT 7411 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1522 M 1 
SSGT 7411 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1522A M 1 
SGT 7411 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1522 M 0 
SGT 7411 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1522B M 0 
    Total 4 
      
MCC 013 MCB CAMLEJ       
MGYSGT 7511 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  ???? M 0 
MSGT 7511 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 2352 M 1 
GYSGT 7511 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 2373 M 1 
GYSGT 7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2383A R 1 
GYSGT 7511 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 2384K M 1 
SSgt  7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2384K M 0 
SSgt  7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2384? M 0 
SGT 7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2367 M 1 
SGT 7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2376 M 1 
SGT 7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2382 M 2 
SGT 7511 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2384D M 1 
    Total 9 
      
MCC 014 MCB CAMPEN       
MGYSGT 7511 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  ???? M 0 
MSGT 7511 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST ???? M 0 
GYSGT 7611 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1980 M 1 
GYSGT 7611 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1986 M 1 
SSGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 0335 R 1 
SSGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 1994 M 1 
SSGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 0515? M 0 
SGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 1987 M 1 
SGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 1995 M 1 
SGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 2002 M 1 
SGT 7611 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 0519? M 0 
    Total 6 
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MCC 015 MCB CAMLEJ       
GYSGT 7711 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  0782A M 1 
SSGT 7711 PROCUREMENT SPEC  0784A M 1 
SGT 7711 PROCUREMENT SPEC  0782D M 1 
SGT 7711 BPA ADMINISTRATOR  0785C M 1 
SGT 7711 PROCUREMENT SPEC  0785G M 1 
    Total 5 
      
MCC 016 MCRD/ERR       
MSGT 7311A PROCUREMENT CHIEF  5175 M 1 
GYSGT 7311A PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC  5173 M 1 
SGT 7311A PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC  5179 M 2 
    Total 4 
      
MCC 017 MCRD/WRR       
SSGT 7211 PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC  0515 M 1 
SGT 7211 PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC  0519 M 1 
    Total 2 
      
MCC 019 MCLB BARSTOW       
MSGT 7010C PROCUREMENT CHIEF 0248 M 1 
SSGT 7010C PURCHASING/CONTRACT SPEC  0827 M 1 
MSGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6358A R 1 
GYSGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6363A R 1 
SGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6363B R 1 
SGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6363C R 2 
GYSGT 7010C PURC/CONT SPECIALIST 6374A R 1 
SGT 7010C PURC/CONT SPECIALIST 6376B R 3 
GYSGT 7010C CONTRACT SPECIALIST 6382A R 1 
SGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6382B R 4 
SSGT 7010C PURC/CONT CLERK 6382C R 2 
    Total 2 
      
MCC 022 MCAS CHERRYPT        
GYSGT 8340 PROCUREMENT CHIEF  ???? M 1 
GYSGT 8340 PURCHASING SPECIALIST ???? M 1 
SGT 8340 PURCHASING SPECIALIST ???? M 0 
    Total 2 
      
MCC 023 MCAS MIRAMAR       
MSGT 8365 CONTRACT SPEC  3904 M 1 
GYSGT 8365 CONTRACT SPEC  3904 M 0 
SSGT 8365 CONTRACT SPEC  3905 M 1 
    Total 1 
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MCC 027 MCAS YUMA       
SSGT 8361 CONTRACT SPEC  ???? M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 028 MCMWTC       
SSGT 7671 PRCOUREMENT SPECIALIST 0108 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 044 IWAKUNI       
GYSGT 8321 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 3682 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 063 MCLB ALBANY       
MGYSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SUP CHIEF  1012 M 1 
MSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1014 M 1 
GYSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1013 M 1 
GYSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1015 M 1 
SSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 0697 M 1 
SSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1016 M 1 
SGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1017 M 0 
SGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1017 M 1 
GYSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1092 R 2 
SSGT 7010A PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 1093 R 1 
    Total 10 
      
MCC 066 MCLB ALBANY       
SGT 7010B PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 3531A M 5 
    Total 5 
      
MCC 070 MARCORSYSCOM        
SSGT 5055A CONTRACT SPECIALIST 0336 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 092 MCB CAMP BUTLER       
MGYSGT 7803 CONTRACTING CHIEF 0043 M 1 
GYSGT 7803 CONTRACT SPEC  0055 M 1 
GYSGT 7803 CONTRACT SPEC  0075 M 1 
SSGT 7803 CONTRACT SPEC  0057 M 1 
SSGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN  0072 M 1 
SSGT 7803 CONTRACT SPEC  0077 M 1 
SGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 0051 M 1 
SGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 0062 M 1 
SGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN  0072 M 0 
SGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN  0073 M 1 
SGT 7803 PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN  0084 M 1 
    Total 10 
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MCC 110 MARFORPAC       
GYSGT 4929N PROCUREMENT CHIEF  0075 M 1 
SGT 4929N PURCHASING CLERK 0080 M 1 
SGT 4929N PURCHASING CLERK 0082 M 1 
    Total 3 
      
MCC 111 MARFORLANT       
GYSGT 4957P PROCUREMENT CHIEF  0075 M 1 
SGT 4957P PURCHASING SPECILIAST 0080 M 1 
    Total 2 
      
MCC 151 2nd FSSG       
GYSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT CHIEF 0137 M 1 
SSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0138 M 1 
SSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0139 M 1 
SSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0140 M 1 
SSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0141 M 0 
SSGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0142 M 0 
SGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0141 M 1 
SGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0142 M 1 
SGT 3321X PROCUREMENT MAN  0143 M 1 
SGT 3321X PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK 0144 M 1 
    Total 8 
      
MCC 169 1st FSSG       
GYSGT 3321F PROCUREMENT CHIEF 0121 M 1 
SSGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0123 M 1 
SSGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0125 M 1 
SSGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0126 M 1 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0127 M 0 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN 0128 M 0 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0127 M 1 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0128 M 1 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0129 M 1 
SGT 3321F PROCUREMENT MAN  0105 M 0 
SGT 3512F PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK 0105 M 1 
    Total 8 
      
MCC 1C2 3d FSSG       
GYSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT CHIEF  0121 M 1 
SSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0123 M 1 
SSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0125 M 1 
SSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0126 M 1 
SSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0127 M 0 
SGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0127 M 1 
SSGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0130? M 0 
SGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0128 M 1 
SGT 3321G PROCUREMENT MAN  0129 M 1 
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    Total 7 
      
MCC 1DH 4TH MEB       
GYSGT ???? CONTRACTING CHIEF ???? M 0 
SSGT ???? CONTRACTING CHIEF 0063 M 0 
    Total 0 
      
MCC 1FY MARFORSOU       
GYSGT ???? CONTRACTING CHIEF ???? M 1 
SSGT ???? PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST ???? M 1 
    Total 2 
      
MCC 1EE MARFOREUR       
SSGT 4961N CONTRACTING CHIEF 0268 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 1GA Blt Is. CMD       
SGT 7010D PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 014A M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC 1GH MARFORRES       
MSGT 7900 PROCUREMENT CHIEF 1013 M 1 
GYSGT 7900 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1015 M 2 
SSGT 7900 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1015A M 0 
SSGT 7900 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 1016 R 1 
SGT 7900 PURCHASING SPECIALIST 1017 M 3 
    Total 7 
      
MCC 233 MBrks 8th&I       
GYSGT 5141 PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN  0078 M 1 
SGT 5141 PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN  0080 M 1 
     Total 2 
      
MCC G78 MATSG Pensacola       
SSGT 8221A PURCHASING NCOIC 0354 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC H65 NJROTC, Memphis TN        
GYSGT ----- PURCHASING NCOIC ------ M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC L9M Orlando       
SSGT 4958 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 0169 M 1 
     Total 1 
      
MCC LA9 MCSA KC       
MSGT 5133A HEAD CONTRACTING CHIEF  0104 M 1 
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SSGT 5133A CONTRACT SPECIALIST(AR) 0105 R 1 
    Total 2 
      
MCC TP6 CBIRF         
GYSGT 4958 CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 0169 M 1 
    Total 1 
      
MCC W25 MCSA KC       
GYSGT 5133A CONTRACTING SPECIALIST 0785G M 1 
    Total 1 
      
   Field  Total 116 
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APPENDIX C.  AIR FORCE CONTRACTING UNIT TYPE CODES 
Mission Capability Statement 
XFFK1: CON CONTRACT LARGE AV SPT IND 
THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
(SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
(OPS), COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPS WITH A 
POPULATION SIZE UP TO 1000 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING 
UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 1000, 
FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR 
AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE.  THE ADVON TEAM 
MUST INCLUDE AN APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED MEMBER ALONG WITH 
A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). 
THIS UTC INCLUDES THE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFK4. CONTRACTING 
MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY LAPTOP COMPUTERS INCLUDED IN THE 
XFFK4. ONE MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIE D, TWO 
MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED, AND THE REMAINING MEMBER 
MUST BE A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. THE 64P3 POSITION, MAY BE 
SUBSTITUTED WITH NO LESS THAN A 6C071, LEVEL II. THE 6C051, 
CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN, POSITION MAY BE SUBSTITUTED WITH A 
64P3, LEVEL I. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE 
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL 
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.  
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting 064P3  03/02 1 
Contracting Craftsman 6C071  1 
Contracting Journeyman 6C051  2 
EQUIPMENT PACKAGE UTC SUPPLIES WEIGHT  
 XFFK4  MS/T 0.2 
 
XFFK2: CON CONTRACT MEDIUM AV SPT IND 
THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
(SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, 
COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPS WITH A 
POPULATION SIZE UP TO 500 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING 
UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 500, 
FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR 
AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE.  THE  ADVON TEAM 
MUST INCLUDE AN APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED MEMBER ALONG WITH 
A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). 
THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT 
PER MEMBER. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS 
MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. ONE MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON 
LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE SECOND MEMBER MUST BE A PRIMARY 5 -SKILL 
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LEVEL. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY
Contracting Craftsman 6C071  1 
Contracting Journeyman 6C051  1 
 
XFFK3: CON CONTRACT OFFICER AV SPT DEP 
THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
(SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, 
COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPERATIONS WITH A 
POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING 
UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 250, 
FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR 
AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE.  THE ADVON TEAM 
MUST INCLUDE THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH THE 
DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS 
UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN 
THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE 
LAPTOP.  MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I. THE M-9 IS THE 
PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS 
BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY 
WITH A WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting  064P3  03/02 1 
 
XFFK4: CON CONTRACTING LARGE EQUIP KIT 
THIS UTC PROVIDES EQUIPMENT OUTLINED IN THE AIR FORCE 
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (AFFARS) APPENDIX 
CC/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL CONTRACTING SUPPORT PROGRAM.  
 
XFFK5: CON CONTRACT 5 LVL AUG SUPT DEP 
THIS DEPENDENT (DEP) UTC IS USED TO AUGMENT THE 
XFFK1/2/3/7/9 IF THE POPULATION SIZE AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION 
INCREASES BY 250 PERSONNEL. THIS UTC MAY ALSO BE USED TO 
CONFRONT FORCE PROTECTION OR GEOGRAPHICAL CONCERNS 
WHERE CCOs HAVE TO TRAVEL OFF BASE IN PAIRS. CONTRACTING 
MEMBERS MUST BE AT LEAST A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. ONE MEMBER 
MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED. THERE IS NO CERTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECOND MEMBER. THIS UTC MAY BE 
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT PER MEMBER. 
WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY 
HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE 
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CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL 
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.  
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting Journeyman 6C051  2 
 
XFFK6: CON CONTRACTING OFFICE CHIEF  
THIS DEPENDENT UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT TO A 
UNIFIED COMPONENT COMMAND CONTRACTING STAFF AS REQUESTED 
BY THE HEAD OF THE CONTRACTING ACTIVITY OF THE AIR COMPONENT. 
THIS UTC ALSO PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPERVISION FOR AF OR 
JOINT CONTRACTING OPERATIONS. THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED 
WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, 
CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. MEMBER MUST 
BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON 
FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS 
AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A 
WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting  064P3  04 1 
 
XFFK7: CON CONTRACT SMALL AV SPT IND 
THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
(SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, 
COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPERATIONS WITH A 
POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING 
UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 250, 
FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR 
AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE.  THE ADVON TEAM 
MUST INCLUDE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH A DISBURSING 
AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS  UTC MAY BE 
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT 
IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. 
MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE M-9 IS THE 
PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS 
BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY 
WITH A WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting Craftsman  6C071  1 
 
XFFK8: CON CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN DEP 
THIS DEPENDENT (DEP) UTC IS USED TO AUGMENT THE 
XFFK1/2/3/7/9 IF THE POPULATION SIZE AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION 
INCREASES BY 250 PERSONNEL. THIS UTC MAY ALSO BE USED TO 
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CONFRONT FORCE PROTECTION OR GEOGRAPHICAL CONCERNS 
WHERE MEMBERS HAVE TO TRAVEL OFF BASE IN PAIRS. MEMBER MUST 
BE A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. APDP CERTIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED. 
THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. 
WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY 
THE LAPTOP. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE 
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. 
CONTRACTING PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WIT H A WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTITY 
Contracting Journeyman 6C051  1  
 
XFFK9: CON CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN IND 
THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
FOR AVIATION SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, COUNTER 
DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN OPS, AND NEO DURING DEPLOYMENTS 
WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL 
CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION 
EXCEEDS 250, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT 
COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE.  THE 
ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH 
A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). 
MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED. THIS UTC MAY BE 
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT 
IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. 
THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING 
PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT. 
 
POSITION AFSC GRADE QUANTIT
Y 
Contracting Journeyman 6C051  1  
 
XFFKT: CON CONTRACT SMALL EQUIP KIT 
THIS UTC PROVIDES EQUIPMENT OUTLINED IN THE AIR FORCE 
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (AFFARS) APPENDIX 
CC/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL CONTRACTING SUPPORT PROGRAM.  
 
 
XFFKA: CON CONTRACTING SUPPORT MIL 
THERE IS NO OFFICIAL MISCAP.  THIS IS A NON-DEPLOYABLE UTC 
FOR PERSONNEL IN A UNIT CONSIDERED IN-PLACE TO SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS.  THIS UTC IS FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN A UNIT ON 
TRAINING STATUS:  64P1 and 6C031. THIS COULD ALSO INCLUDE ANY 
OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL ON PROFILE OR NOT ON A NORMAL 




XFFKC: CON CONTRACTING SUPPORT CIV 
THERE IS NO OFFICIAL MISCAP.  THIS IS A NON-DEPLOYABLE UTC.  
THIS UTC IS FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN A UNIT CONSIDERED IN-PLACE 

















































APPENDIX D. 3044 SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
 
Official Survey  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Office of Academic Administration  
Monterey, CA 93943 
   
 
MOS 3044 Survey 
This survey is being conducted in conjunction with initiatives at Headquarters 
Marine Corps I & L Contracts Division, Community Management Team and MOS 
Sponsor to improve the career development of Marines assigned to the 3044 MOS.  Your 
answers will be used to identify recommendations designed to improve your education, 
training, and promotion opportunities.  The combined survey results and report 
recommendations will be forwarded to HQMC LB for future consideration.  Your survey 
information may very well benefit your future!  
Your responses to this survey are ANONYMOUS.  The web based program you 
are using to input your responses will only provide the researcher with the aggregate 
responses to each question.  The program will not associate your responses to your name 
in any way. 
Answer the questions as accurately and completely as possible.  Questions that 
ask you to type in a response have a limited amount of space for your answer.  Please do 
your best to fit your answer into the space provided.  Short bullet -type answers work best, 
but feel free to fill the allotted space.   
If you have questions about the survey, or would like to elaborate on a particular 
question(s), that cannot be included in the space provided, please send an e-mail to the 
















2. From the list below, Which type of command best identifies the one you 
are currently assigned to? If none of the selections are appropriate please select 
other.  
HQ -LB  
Quantico  
MCB Camp Lejeune  
MCB Camp Pendelton  
MCRD  
MCLB Barstow  
MCAS Cherry Point  
MCAS Miramar  
MCB Camp Butler  
MARFOR -LANT/PAC  
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MARFOR - UER/SOU  
MARFORRES  
1st FSSG  
2nd FSSG  
3rd FSSG  
Other  
 




4. If your answer to Question #3 was "No", please explain briefly why your 
answer was "No".  
 
 






6. How long have you been in the 3044 MOS (including your OJT time)?  
Less than 1 year  
1-2 years  
3-5 years  
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6-8 years  
9-11 years  
12-14 years  
15-17 years  
17-19 years  
20 years or greater  
 
7. What DAWIA Certification Level (in the contracting field) do you 
currently hold?  
Level I  
Level II  
Level III  
 
8. What DAWIA Certification Level does your current billet require?  
Level I  
Level II  
Level III  
 
9. What difficulties have you experienced when trying to attain you r 
certification level?  
 
 
10. Are you currently assigned to a base or a contingency contracting billet?  
Base contracting billet  
Contingency contracting billet  
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11. Have you completed a tour in a "B" billet (Recruiting, Drill Instructor, 




12. Have you completed a tour on the SNCO Degree Completion Program 




13. If you have completed a tour in a "B" billet or the SNCO Degree 
Completion Program (answered "Yes" to question #11 or #12), what difficulties did 




14. How long were you in an On the Job Training (OJT) status?  
1 month  
2 months  
3 months  
4 months  
5 months  
6 months  
7 months  
8 months  
9 months  
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10 months or more  
 
15. What was your first duty assignment following the completion of your 
OJT period? Briefly describe.  
 
 
16. What DAU courses were you able to attend during your OJT period? List 
only those courses attended during the OJT period.  
 
 
17. What difficulties did you experience trying to attend DAU courses during 
your OJT period? Briefly list the course(s) and the difficulties you experienced 




18. What difficulties have you experienced trying to attend DAU courses 




19. Have you been able to achieve the 80 hours of continuous learning 





20. If you have NOT been able to meet the 80 hours of continuous learning 
within the 2 year time period, briefly describe the difficulties you have encountered.  
 
 




22. If your office/unit/section DOES have an annual training plan, briefly 




23. From the choices below select the highest degree you currently posses?  
High School Diploma or equivalent  
Associate Degree  
Baccalaureate Degree  
Masters Degree or higher  
 
24. Do you meet the minimum 24 semester credit hours of business related 





25. If you DO NOT meet the 24 semester credit hours of business courses, 
how many business related college credits did you have prior to entering t he MOS? 











26. If you DO NOT meet the 24 semester credit hours of business courses, 
how many business related cre dits have you been able to acquire after entering the 
















28. What problems have you encountered when trying to attend college 
courses after you entered the MOS? (i.e., deployments, long work hours, course s not 
available, etc.)  
 
 
29. How do you think your education opportunities can be improved?  
 
   
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING EXPERIENCE 




31. If you have NOT been able to serve in a contingency contracting billet, 
what has prevented you from serving in a contingency billet? (i.e., lack of 




32. If you have not had the opportunity to serve in a contingency billet, do 




33. How many TOURS have you completed in contingency contracting 






5 or more  
 
34. During your MOST RECENT contingency contracting tour ONLY, How  
many contingency or training deployments have you participated in that required 









8 or more  
 
35. During ALL contingency contracting tours PRIOR to your most recent 
contingency contracting tour, how many contingency or training operations have 
125 











10 or more  
 
36. If you were issued any waivers to be able to deploy, such as a waiver for 
your certification level, briefly explain or put NA if this question does not apply.  
 
 
37. Have you participated in operations or exercises where you had the 





38. If you HAVE had the opportunity to observe enlisted contingency 
contracting personnel from other services, how would you rate their training 





Not applicable  
 
39. If you HAVE had the opportunity to observe enlisted continge ncy 
contracting personnel from other services, how would you rate their education 




Not applicable  
 
40. How do you think the Marine Corps contingency contracting process can 
be improved?  
 
FUTURE INTENTIONS  
41. Do you plan to get your As sociates or Baccalaureate degree while on 





42. Once you attain your desired degree, do you plan to remain on active 
duty or seek employment in the civilian market?  
Remain on active duty  
Seek civilian employment  
Undecided  
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Federal Civil Service  
 
43. If you plan to depart active duty, select all of the following that would be 
an attractive incentive to keep you on active duty?  
Higher retention bonus  
Contracting Warrant Officer Program  
Selection for a commissioned officer program  
Faster promotions  
More responsibility  
Does not apply (plan to retire)  
 
44. What changes in the 3044 MOS do you recommend?  
 
 
Click Here to Send 
 
 
Return to the Home Page, without sending answers. 
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